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WHEN FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES MEET 
CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES 
TANYA J. MONESTIER* 
Many contracts that contain a forum selection clause also contain a choice 
of law clause. This raises the issue of whether to apply the parties’ chosen law 
to questions of forum selection clause interpretation, such as whether the clause 
is mandatory or permissive and how far the scope of the clause extends. The 
recent trend has been for courts to apply the law selected by the parties in their 
choice of law clause to govern these interpretation issues. This Article argues 
that the law has gone in the wrong direction and that courts should apply 
forum law to questions of forum selection clause interpretation. 
This Article challenges each of the stated rationales in favor of applying the 
parties’ chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause: the party autonomy 
argument; the intention of the parties argument; the certainty and predictability 
argument; the substance versus procedure argument; the “part of the contract” 
argument; and the forum shopping argument. None of the purported arguments 
in favor of applying the parties’ chosen law stand up to closer scrutiny. 
Additionally, this Article examines the myriad complications presented by 
interpreting a forum selection clause in conjunction with a choice of law clause. 
Foremost among these is the sheer complexity of the exercise. Particularly when it 
comes to applying foreign country law, there is uncertainty over exactly what the 
“chosen law” is. If the parties have selected the law of a European Union country, 
for instance, there are a variety of possible laws that could apply: internal domestic 
law, the Brussels Regulation, the Hague Choice of Court Convention, or some 
combination thereof. Additional complications are presented by structural 
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dynamics of the choice of law endeavor: the principle of party prosecution and 
the differential treatment of forum selection clauses in a contract without a 
choice of law clause. Finally, when one examines what courts are doing in 
practice, it is clear that they are not particularly adept at ascertaining and 
applying the parties’ chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. The net 
result is a hodge-podge interpretation of mixed U.S. and foreign law. 
The choice of law exercise is complicated enough. This Article suggests that 
we need not make it any more complicated by using the parties’ chosen law to 
interpret a preliminary issue. Ultimately, the responsibility is on the parties to 
draft forum selection clauses clearly and without ambiguity. If they do so, then 
none of this is an issue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Parties to contracts, particularly international contracts, desire 
certainty. They want to know ahead of time where they will litigate if a 
dispute arises and under what law. Accordingly, contracts often 
contain both forum selection and choice of law clauses.1 If a forum 
selection clause is carefully drafted, then the inquiry should be fairly 
straightforward. For instance, if the parties agree that “the courts of 
France shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any and all claims related 
to the contract, including, without limitation, any statutory or tort 
claims,” there is little interpretative wiggle room. The parties clearly 
intended the clause to be mandatory, since they expressly used the 
term “exclusive.” And they clearly intended for the clause to be 
construed very broadly to cover all claims, including statutory and 
tort claims. If a party files suit in New York in contravention of the 
clause, the court would likely have little difficulty enforcing the clause 
by dismissing the action. 
Unfortunately, forum selection clauses are not always a model of 
clarity. They are frequently lifted from other contracts without much 
thought to their exact wording or scope. This leaves courts with the 
unenviable task of trying to figure out “what the parties intended” by 
a particular forum selection clause. Did they intend for the clause to 
be permissive or mandatory? Did they intend for related tort claims 
to be adjudicated in the chosen forum? Did they intend for non-
signatories to be bound by the clause? None of these are easy 
 
 1. Symeon C. Symeonides, What Law Governs Forum Selection Clauses, 78 LA. L. 
REV. 1119, 1135 (2018) (“Parties who have the foresight to seek jurisdictional 
certainty through a [forum selection] clause also tend to be equally concerned with 
choice-of-law certainty.”). 
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questions. However, over the years, courts have developed a number 
of interpretative canons to help guide them in the exercise.2 
The issue becomes considerably more complex when choice of law 
clauses enter into the mix. A choice of law clause complicates the 
inquiry because it raises the specter that the parties’ chosen law 
should apply to these interpretative questions. If a U.S. court is called 
upon to interpret a forum selection clause in a contract also 
containing a choice of law clause, it faces a choice of law decision: 
Should it apply forum law to interpret the forum selection clause? Or, 
should it apply the parties’ chosen law? Up until fairly recently, it was 
common to see courts applying forum law to interpret a forum selection 
clause. The reasoning was that issues related to the validity and 
enforcement of a forum selection clause were procedural matters to be 
governed by the law of the forum, and the interpretation of a forum 
selection clause was a necessary prerequisite to its enforcement.3 
Lately, though, courts have held that issues of forum selection 
clause interpretation should be governed by the law chosen by the 
parties in their contract. They advance several arguments in support 
of this position. First, choice of law is a manifestation of party 
autonomy, and courts should not interfere with that autonomy. 
Second, courts should strive to give effect to the intentions of the 
parties; by selecting the governing law, the parties intend for a court 
to interpret the contract, including the forum selection clause, in 
accordance with that law. Third, outcomes will be more certain if 
courts apply the parties’ chosen law to interpretative questions 
presented by a forum selection clause. Fourth, matters of contractual 
interpretation are fundamentally substantive in nature and therefore 
should be governed by the chosen law. Fifth, since a forum selection 
clause is part of a contract, there is no principled justification for 
singling it out and applying a law other than the chosen law. Sixth, by 
interpreting a forum selection clause in accordance with the chosen 
law, forum shopping is curtailed. 
This Article challenges each of these rationales, arguing that they 
do not provide a compelling justification for applying the parties’ 
chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. This Article also 
describes the myriad complications that arise when courts purport to 
apply the parties’ chosen law to questions of interpretation, 
 
 2. John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1826 (2019). 
 3. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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particularly where the parties have chosen foreign law4 to govern 
their dispute. Many years ago, Professor Mullenix observed that: 
 
When confronted with a combined forum-selection and choice-of-
law provision, most courts construe the forum-selection clause 
without any reference to the choice-of-law provision . . . . A few 
courts, however, have speculated that the presence of a contractual 
choice-of-law provision might alter this conventional course of 
events. Such idle speculation leads courts into predictable conflict-
of-laws contortions.5 
We are now in the midst of these “predictable conflict-of-laws 
contortions.”6 This Article endeavors to move courts away from these 
contortions and toward a much simpler analysis. 
This Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, I discuss forum selection 
clauses and how they are treated by U.S. courts. In Part II, I introduce 
the complications presented by a contract containing both a forum 
selection clause and a choice of law clause. Next, in Part III, I propose a 
four-part framework for approaching the intersection between these two 
types of clauses. I then transition in Part IV to my primary argument: 
that the rationales advanced in support of applying the parties’ chosen 
law to question of forum selection clause interpretation are not 
persuasive. In Part V, I provide five separate reasons for why courts 
should not use the parties’ chosen law to interpret forum selection 
clauses, especially when that law is foreign law. Finally, I offer some 
concluding remarks about how much of this can be easily avoided. 
I.    FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN U.S. COURTS 
Forum selection clauses7 are ubiquitous in contracts, particularly 
international commercial contracts.8 They are seen as a manifestation 
of party autonomy and are thought to provide a measure of 
 
 4. “Foreign” law is often thought to refer to either the law of another state or 
the law of another country. In this Article, I generally use the term in the latter sense. 
 5. Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 347 (1988) (footnotes omitted). 
 6. Id. 
 7. U.S. courts tend to use the term “forum selection clause.” Courts in other 
countries typically use the term “jurisdiction clause” or “jurisdiction agreement.” Other 
common monikers include “choice of court clause” and “choice of forum clause.” 
 8. Matthew J. Sorensen, Note, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal 
Court After Atlantic Marine, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2528 (2014) (“Forum-selection 
clauses have permeated American commercial activity to such an extent that even many 
of today’s form contracts designate the appropriate forum to litigate disputes.”). 
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foreseeability and predictability with respect to any potential 
litigation. There are two broad types of forum selection clauses: 
mandatory and permissive.9 A mandatory forum selection clause 
requires that the parties litigate only in their designated forum. That 
is, a mandatory clause purports to preclude the parties from initiating 
suit in any jurisdiction other than the one chosen in the forum 
selection clause. By contrast, a permissive forum selection clause, as its 
name suggests, merely permits the parties to sue in the chosen forum, but 
does not preclude them from suing elsewhere.10 Mandatory forum 
selection clauses tend to be more common because they are seen as 
providing a greater measure of certainty to the parties. 
In an ideal world, parties would sue in the place they designated in 
an exclusive forum selection clause. However, we do not live in an 
ideal world, and parties often flout the obligations that they assumed 
under a forum selection clause. When they do so, a court other than 
the court chosen in the forum selection clause must decide what to 
do. Should it proceed with the litigation despite the clause? Or, 
should it dismiss or transfer the proceedings? In other words, the 
forum must decide what effect the forum selection clause has on its 
ability to hear the case. This will require a court to answer some 
pivotal questions: Is the forum selection clause valid? Is the clause, in 
fact, mandatory? Does the clause encompass the dispute at issue? The 
answers to these questions will determine what a court will do next. 
In federal court, once a court determines that the clause is valid, 
mandatory, and encompasses the dispute at issue, it will usually 
dismiss or transfer the case. A federal court will dismiss an action if 
the forum designated in the forum selection clause is either a foreign 
country or a state court,11 and it will transfer an action if the designated 
 
 9. These are sometimes referred to as “exclusive” and “non-exclusive.” See also 
Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A 
Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 56 n.1 (1992) (“Some civilian 
commentators use the term ‘derogation agreement’ to describe exclusive forum 
agreements, [and] ‘prorogation agreement’ to describe non-exclusive forum agreements.”). 
 10. Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 768 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Our 
caselaw recognizes a sharp distinction between mandatory and permissive [forum 
selection clauses]. A mandatory [forum selection clause] affirmatively requires that 
litigation arising from the contract be carried out in a given forum. By contrast, a 
permissive [forum selection clause] is only a contractual waiver of personal-jurisdiction 
and venue objections if litigation is commenced in the specified forum.”). 
 11. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 
60–61 (2013) (“[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing 
to a state or foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Section 
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forum is another federal court.12 This is its way of “enforcing” the clause; 
by shutting litigants out of the federal forum, it indirectly forces litigants 
to the place chosen in their forum selection clause.13 
Importantly, dismissal or transfer is not automatic. It is effectuated 
through the forum’s procedural mechanisms and rules. A federal 
court, faced with a valid forum selection clause in favor of another 
federal court, will usually14 transfer the case to that other federal 
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.15 This section authorizes transfer to 
another district court “for the convenience of parties and witnesses” 
 
1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for the 
subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court system; in 
such cases, Congress has replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with 
transfer . . . . For the remaining set of cases calling for a nonfederal forum, § 1404(a) 
has no application, but the residual doctrine of forum non conveniens ‘has 
continuing application in federal courts’. . . . And because both § 1404(a) and the 
forum non conveniens doctrine from which it derives entail the same balancing-of-
interests standard, courts should evaluate a forum-selection clause pointing to a 
nonfederal forum in the same way that they evaluate a forum-selection clause 
pointing to a federal forum.”). 
 12. Id. at 52 (“Instead, a forum-selection clause may be enforced by a motion to 
transfer under § 1404(a), which provides that ‘[f]or the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any 
other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or 
division to which all parties have consented.’”). 
 13. Even though this Article largely treats transfer and dismissal as though they 
were equivalent (i.e., the forum is declining to hear the case), the two are very 
different remedies. See Robin Effron, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Forum Non 
Conveniens, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 708–09 (2015) (“[A] forum non conveniens 
dismissal can have a much greater impact on the outcome of a case, both as to issues of 
liability and the quantum of recovery. Much scholarship, such as the Clermont and 
Eisenberg study that demonstrated that § 1404(a) transfers . . . can have a significant 
effect on case outcomes, acknowledges that forum non conveniens dismissals are a 
different world altogether.”). 
 14. For a case that refused to transfer the action, see Connex Railroad LLC v. 
AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 15. Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 766 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Atlantic 
Marine . . . clarified the proper mechanism for enforcing [forum selection clauses]. 
That dispute concerned [a forum selection clause] pointing to a U.S. court; the 
Court held that the proper mechanism for enforcing such a clause is a motion for 
transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court also specified that the 
proper mechanism to enforce [a forum selection clause] that calls for litigation in a 
domestic state court or in a foreign court is through a motion to dismiss on grounds 
of [forum non conveniens]. The Court further announced the effect that a 
mandatory and enforceable [forum selection clause] should have on the § 1404(a) 
and [forum non conveniens] analyses.”). 
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and “in the interest of justice.”16 It is the federal equivalent of the 
common law forum non conveniens doctrine.17 When federal courts 
are faced with a valid and enforceable forum selection clause in favor 
of another state, they must give primacy to the forum selection 
clause. Accordingly, they do not conduct a “normal” forum non 
conveniens analysis—i.e., looking at whether public and private 
interest factors warrant dismissal.18 Instead, a court considering 
transfer in light of a mandatory forum selection clause may only 
examine public interest factors in the transfer analysis.19 This is 
because, by entering into the forum selection clause in the first place, 
the parties have effectively waived their right to challenge the chosen 
forum as inconvenient.20 
The same general analysis applies where the clause nominates a 
foreign court or a state court in the forum selection clause. However, 
in this case, a federal court would resort to the common law doctrine 
 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 17. Effron, supra note 13, at 696 (“The Atlantic Marine opinion emphasized that 
when Congress drafted § 1404(a), the intent was to codify the existing doctrine of 
forum non conveniens for the subset of cases where transfer is sought within the 
federal system . . . .”). Professor Effron argues that the Supreme Court in Atlantic 
Marine “overstated the equivalence between these two doctrines” and that “there are 
good policy reasons for affirming that § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens are 
parallel but distinct doctrines.” Id. at 702–03. 
 18. Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 
62–63 (2013). 
 19. Id. at 64. Private-interest factors include: 
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process 
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, 
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the 
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, 
expeditious and inexpensive. 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). The public-interest factors include: the administrative 
difficulties that arise from court congestion; the locality’s interest in having localized 
controversies decided close to home; and the interest in having the trial of a diversity case 
in a forum that is familiar with the law. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09. 
 20. There are two other ways that the Supreme Court indicated that the forum 
selection clause would impact the analysis, neither of which is germane for the 
purpose of this Article. First, the plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no deference, 
since the plaintiff has violated a forum selection clause. Atl. Marine Const. Co., 571 
U.S. at 63. Second, if the case is transferred under § 1404, the transferee court will 
apply its own choice of law rules to the dispute (i.e., the Van Dusen rule which 
requires that a transferee court apply the choice of law rules of the transferor court 
does not apply). Id. at 64–66. 
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of forum non conveniens, with the necessary adjustments mandated 
by the presence of a forum selection clause.21 The law in state courts 
is similar, with the obvious difference being that state courts do not 
have the power to transfer cases to another state.22 State courts will 
usually employ some version of the forum non conveniens doctrine 
or specific state law on forum selection agreements to dismiss an 
action where the parties have entered into a valid forum selection 
clause nominating a court in another state or country.23 
II.    WHEN FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES MEET CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES 
Things become considerably more complicated when forum 
selection clauses meet choice of law clauses.24 A typical forum 
selection clause will provide something to the effect that “any and all 
disputes arising out of, or related to, this contract will be adjudicated 
exclusively in State A.” As discussed above, oftentimes a party will 
choose to file suit in State B in contravention of the forum selection 
 
 21. Id. at 66 n.8 (“[T]he same standards should apply to motions to dismiss 
for forum non conveniens in cases involving valid forum-selection clauses pointing to 
state or foreign forums.”); Sorensen, supra note 8, at 2549 (“Section 1404(a) and the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens are now firmly established as appropriate 
procedural mechanisms for enforcement of forum-selection clauses.”). 
 22. Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Interpretation and Effect of Permissive Forum Selection 
Clauses Under U.S. Law, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 127, 141 (2018). 
 23. See Buxbaum, supra note 22, at 141 (“There is no procedural mechanism by 
which a state court can transfer a case to a more convenient forum in another state 
(or another country). However, a defendant can move to dismiss a case on the basis 
of inconvenience, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Almost all states 
adhere to this common law doctrine . . . . Although there is some variation among 
the states, in essence they follow the same approach that was announced as a rule of 
federal common law in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.”); Michael D. Moberly & Carolyn F. 
Burr, Enforcing Forum Selection Clauses in State Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 265, 276–77 (2009) 
(“Although Bremen arose under the federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis had an enormous influence on the enforceability of forum 
selection clauses in subsequent state court litigation.”). But see Kevin M. Clermont, 
Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 648 (2015) (noting 
that “[s]ome U.S. states still consider forum-selection clauses to be per se 
unenforceable . . . while other states sometimes ignore them by giving them less 
weight than other contracts . . .”). 
 24. Mullenix, supra note 5, at 346–47 (“If forum-selection cases are somewhat 
unsettling in their analytical methodology, then forum-selection cases complicated by 
a concurrent choice-of-law provision are even more daunting. . . . Although some 
courts quite sensibly ignore the presence of a concurrent choice-of-law clause,” 
others “have been irresistibly drawn to this ‘intellectual tar baby.’”). 
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clause.25 The defendant will likely resist litigating in State B and ask 
State B to dismiss or transfer the suit. The plaintiff, on the other hand, 
will probably raise issues related to the validity, enforceability, or 
interpretation26 of the forum selection clause in order to avoid suit in 
State A. For instance, the plaintiff may argue that the forum selection 
clause is invalid and therefore should not be given effect. The plaintiff’s 
goal, of course, is to keep the case in the courts of State B. 
Questions of validity focus on whether the forum selection clause 
was validly formed27 and whether there are reasons not to enforce the 
clause.28 When dealing with the validity of forum selection clauses, 
 
 25. Professor Symonedies provides a very detailed framework for thinking about 
cases involving forum selection and choice of law clauses. His article divides the cases 
into three categories: 
 The first category includes cases in which the action is filed in the court 
chosen in the [forum selection] clause (“Scenario 1”). The second category 
encompasses all cases in which the action is filed in another court. For 
purposes of analysis, these cases are divided into two subcategories: (a) cases 
in which the [forum selection] clause is not accompanied by a choice-of-law 
clause (“Scenario 2”); and (b) cases in which the [forum selection] clause is 
accompanied by a choice-of-law clause, usually contained in the same 
contract (“Scenario 3”). 
Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1121–22. As Professor Symeonides notes, “[Scenario 3] 
occurs far more frequently than either Scenario 1 or Scenario 2.” Id. at 1135. 
 26. See Sorensen, supra note 8, at 2546 n.227 (“A brief clarification of 
terminology: courts often use the terms ‘validity’ and ‘enforceability’ or 
‘enforcement’ of forum-selection clause interchangeably. There is, however, a 
meaningful difference between the terms. This Note uses the term ‘validity’ to 
describe the inquiry into whether a given forum-selection clause is effective and 
binding as a matter of substantive law and uses the term ‘enforceability’ to describe 
the inquiry into whether a given forum-selection clause should be enforced.”). 
 27. This would entail, inter alia, determining whether there was mutual assent 
and whether the forum selection clause complied with any required formalities. 
 28. A forum selection clause may be unenforceable, for instance, if it is 
unconscionable, procured by fraud, against public policy, or the product of undue 
influence or duress. Buxbaum, supra note 22, at 133 (“Like any clause in a contract, a 
forum selection clause can be challenged as invalid on the basis of formal defects 
(for instance, the absence of a required writing) or defects in the consent of one of 
the parties (for instance, that it was procured by duress, fraud, mistake, or the like). 
Formal validity is rarely an issue in practice, and allegations of duress and other 
similar practices are rare. However, parties frequently challenge the validity of forum 
selection clauses contained in adhesion contracts on the basis of unconscionability 
. . . .”). As a matter of contract law, the term “invalid” is probably inapt, though this 
Article continues to use that term because it is in common usage in this context. If a 
contract was not formed, then it is not “invalid”—it simply does not exist. 
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the analysis is a little muddy—at least in federal courts. This is 
because it is not clear whether federal courts sitting in diversity 
should use federal law or state law to determine the validity of a 
forum selection clause.29 One commentator explains that the split of 
authority is “rooted in two distinct qualities of forum-selection clauses: 
(1) they are agreements relating to the forum for adjudication which 
may or may not be enforceable; and (2) they are contractual 
agreements which may or may not be enforceable.”30 In practice, there 
is usually a great deal of overlap between federal and state law31 on 
the validity of forum selection clauses, so it may not matter much 
which law a court applies.32 
 
Additionally, doctrines such as undue influence, unconscionability, duress, etc. 
render a contract voidable or unenforceable, not “invalid.” 
 29. Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan R. Jones, Adrift on Erie: Characterizing Forum-
Selection Clauses, 52 AKRON L. REV. 297, 314 (2018) (“If suit is brought in federal court 
on the basis of diversity, and a contract between the parties contains a forum-
selection clause, should its validity be determined under the Bremen standard, or 
under the state law that governs the contract?”). 
 30. Sorensen, supra note 8, at 2548; see also id. at 2548–49 (“Courts that dwell on 
the first quality reason that forum-selection clauses are simply venue agreements, i.e., 
they indicate the parties’ agreed-upon venue for adjudication of their disputes. 
Then, eliding the distinction between validity and enforceability, these courts assert 
that, since venue is manifestly a question of federal procedural law, enforcement and 
validity of such clauses is a question also governed by federal law. . . . Courts that 
dwell on the second quality, i.e., the fact that forum clauses are contractual provisions 
whose validity is determined by substantive law, recognize that the ’construction of 
contracts is usually a matter of state, not federal, common law,’ . . . .”). 
 31. State and federal courts generally apply the guidance laid out by the 
Supreme Court in the Bremen case. See Jon A. Jacobson, Your Place or Mine: The 
Enforceability of Choice-of-Law/Forum Clauses in International Securities Contracts, 8 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 469, 480 (1998) (“Thus, the court identified four grounds (the 
Bremen factors) sufficient to invalidate a [forum selection] clause: (1) if the contract 
were obtained through ‘fraud or overreaching’; (2) if the forum were so remote that 
the complaining party would ‘for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in 
court’; (3) if enforcement would be ‘unreasonable and unjust’; and (4) if 
enforcement ‘would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit 
is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.’”). 
 32. See, e.g., IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 
611 (7th Cir. 2006) (“At the black-letter level, Illinois law concerning the validity of 
forum selection clauses is materially the same as federal law.”); Cornice Techs., Inc. v. 
Affinity Dental Prods., Inc., No. 04-cv-01133-EWN-OES, 2005 WL 1712124, at *7 n.4 (D. 
Colo. July 21, 2005) (“The parties have not addressed the choice of law issues surrounding 
the forum selection clause. The choice of law issue is whether the court should [determine 
the enforceability of] the forum selection clause under California state law, Colorado state 
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Things become considerably more involved, however, when parties 
have included a choice of law clause in their contract. Many contracts 
that contain a forum selection clause will also contain a choice of law 
clause.33 A typical choice of law clause provides that the contract “will 
be governed by the law of State A.”34 Using the example above, a State 
B court will need to decide what law applies to determine the validity 
of the forum selection clause nominating State A.35 In particular, 
should a court use the parties’ chosen law to determine the validity of 
the forum selection clause?36 The majority of federal courts hold that 
the parties’ chosen law should not govern questions of validity, since 
such questions are inherently procedural and therefore governed by 
federal law.37 State courts follow a similar practice, characterizing 
 
law, or federal common law. Since there are no material differences between these various 
laws, I find it unnecessary to decide the issue.” (citations omitted)). 
 33. Borchers, supra note 9, at 81 (noting that it is “quite common” for a “forum 
selection clause [to be] accompanied by a choice-of-law clause”). 
 34. See John F. Coyle & Christopher R. Drahozal, An Empirical Study of Dispute 
Resolution Clauses in International Supply Contracts, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 335 
(2019) (“In theory, a choice-of-law clause may be framed in a near-infinite number of 
ways. In practice, however, most clauses are framed in one of three specific ways. 
First, a choice-of-law clause may state that the contract will be ‘interpreted’ in 
accordance with the laws of a particular jurisdiction. Second, a clause may stipulate 
that the contract will be ‘construed’ in accordance with the laws of that jurisdiction. 
Third, a clause may provide that the contract will be ‘governed by’ the laws of that 
jurisdiction. The question of whether the precise phrase utilized in the clause matters 
has generated a split among US courts. Most courts have held that ‘interpret,’ 
‘construe,’ and ‘govern’ all mean the same thing.” (footnote omitted)). 
 35. Typically, the forum selection clause and choice of law clause will match up. 
But see MBC Fin. Servs. Ltd. v. Bos. Merch. Fin., Ltd., 704 F. App’x 14, 17 & n.1 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (examining a corporate client agreement with a Swiss forum selection 
clause and a British Virgin Islands choice of law clause). 
 36. Some commentators suggest that a court could apply the law of state 
nominated in the forum selection clause. See Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1135 
(“[T]he seized court has . . . three options for the enforceability and interpretation 
of the [forum selection] clause . . . namely: (1) apply the internal law of the seized 
forum—the lex fori; (2) apply the substantive law of the forum designated in the 
[forum selection] clause; or (3) apply the law that governs the underlying contract—
lex contractus.”). The rationale for applying the law of the state chosen in the forum 
selection clause is evasive. 
 37. For those courts that view the validity of a forum selection clause as a 
substantive matter under Erie—and therefore governed by state law—there is a 
secondary question to be answered: does state law characterize the issue as 
substantive or procedural for conflict of laws purposes? In other words, a federal 
court applying state law must ask whether to apply forum law, or the law dictated by 
the forum’s conflict of laws rules. Buxbaum, supra note 22, at 151 (“Most federal 
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questions of validity as procedural and therefore governed by forum 
law, not the chosen law.38 Oftentimes, the practice is largely reflexive, 
with courts providing little to no discussion of the rationale for 
applying forum law to questions of validity.39 
Although there is not much academic discussion on the topic, 
there is some disagreement on whether forum law or chosen law 
should govern questions related to the validity of forum selection 
clauses. Professor Yackee argues that the parties’ chosen law should 
govern these issues.40 He maintains that forum law is a “poor choice” 
to govern forum selection clauses for the following reasons: 
[I]t risks subjecting the contract to multiple laws, it makes it 
difficult for parties to anticipate at the contract drafting stage 
which law will actually be applied to [the forum selection clause], it 
may promote forum shopping, and it ignores the parties’ 
bargained-for jurisdictional expectations by overlooking a 
contract’s explicit or implicit choice of law.41 
Accordingly, Professor Yackee’s position is that forum selection 
agreements “should be governed first and foremost by the parties’ 
 
courts sitting in diversity have concluded that the validity of a forum selection clause 
is clearly procedural, and should be controlled by the Bremen rule as a matter of 
federal common law. By this approach, a federal court simply applies the rule of 
presumptive validity directly. Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion, 
characterizing questions of validity as a matter of substantive contract law. This 
analysis should logically begin by applying local choice of law rules. Some courts follow 
that approach, which generally leads them to determine validity pursuant to the law 
chosen by the parties. However, here, much like state courts, federal courts often 
skip over the choice of law analysis. They simply apply the substantive law of the 
forum in considering the validity of a forum selection clause.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 38. See Clermont, supra note 23, at 649. 
 39. Id. (“Almost all American courts apply their own law, the lex fori [to forum 
selection agreements]. Most do so with little or no thinking.”). 
 40. Jason Webb Yackee, Choice of Law Considerations in the Validity & Enforcement of 
International Forum Selection Agreements: Whose Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 43, 47 (2004).  
 41. Id. at 83. Professor Yackee makes this comment with respect to international 
forum selection agreements, but the arguments would theoretically hold true in the 
domestic context as well. 
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explicit choice of law.”42 And, indeed, a few U.S. courts have applied the 
parties’ chosen law to questions concerning validity and enforceability.43 
Professor Clermont, on the other hand, argues that forum law 
should apply to determine the validity of forum selection clauses. He 
provides a host of policy reasons as to why this should be the case, 
including arguments related to forum control over jurisdiction, the 
procedural nature of the issue, and the potential to weed out abusive 
clauses.44 Professor Symeonides concludes that “[a]ll things 
considered, Clermont has the better arguments.”45 He is particularly 
persuaded by the argument that if a forum were to apply the chosen 
law to test the validity of a forum selection clause this would unduly 
punish weaker parties who have likely “agreed” to unfavorable choice of 
law clauses.46 Professor Symeonides notes that in many cases, these choice 
of law clauses are “usually drafted by the corporate defendant, virtually 
never negotiated, and often unsuspectingly imposed on the weak party.”47 
Despite Professor Yackee’s criticism of the practice, and a handful 
of outlier cases, it seems to be settled law that the forum will use its 
own law48 to determine the validity of a forum selection clause 
contained in a contract that also includes a choice of law clause. 
According to Professor Symeonides, the “vast majority” of U.S. courts 
 
 42. Id. at 94. Somewhat strangely, Professor Yackee posits that, “In the event that 
the parties have not made an explicit choice, the law of the designated forum should 
govern the [forum selection agreement]. That law has the highest probability of 
corresponding to the parties’ bargained-for jurisdictional expectations in the 
absence of an explicit choice of law.” Id. 
 43. See Vinci v. V.F. Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00091, 2018 WL 339942, at *3 (D. Vt. Jan. 
9, 2018) (federal court in Vermont applying the parties’ chosen law, California law, 
to the enforceability of the forum selection clause in the Agreement); Bahl v. N.Y. 
Coll. of Osteopathic Med. of N.Y. Inst. of Tech., No. 14-cv-4020 (AKT), 2017 WL 
5479655, at *8–9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (federal court in New York applying the 
chosen law, Indiana law, to determine whether the forum selection clause at issue 
was unconscionable); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 329 P.3d 1264, 1268 
(Mont. 2014) (Montana court applying California law, the chosen law, to determine 
whether the forum selection clause was valid). 
 44. For a list of the rationales, see Clermont, supra note 23, at 654–56. 
 45. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1154. 
 46. Id. at 1154–55. 
 47. Id. at 1155. 
 48. By “forum law,” I mean federal law in federal court, and state law in state 
court (with no reference to the choice of law clause). 
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apply forum law to questions of validity and “more often than not, do 
so without a choice-of-law inquiry.”49 
The law gets even more complex when it comes to questions of 
forum selection clause interpretation.50 A court will often need to 
interpret a forum selection clause to determine, for instance, whether 
the claim at issue even falls within the purview of the clause.51 
Questions of interpretation usually fall within one of the following 
three52 categories: (1) Is the forum selection clause mandatory or 
permissive? In other words, does the clause require the parties to 
submit their dispute to the chosen forum, or merely permit them to 
 
 49. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1152; see also Clermont, supra note 23, at 652–53 
(“The typical treatise approach is to describe the American cases as split between lex 
fori and the chosen law. That description suffers from a serious selection effect: 
looking only at cases that decide the point is inapt because they are a biased subset of 
the run of all cases (or all disputes). The great mass of cases presenting the problem 
do not expressly allude to it at all, be that the fault of the judges or the lawyers. The 
few cases that discuss the problem tend to split; they draw all the attention of treatise 
writers; the result is to make this puzzle look a good deal more puzzling than it is. 
What are the cases that ignore the problem doing? They, of course, are applying lex 
fori. So, if we were to consider all American cases, we would say that the vast majority 
apply lex fori. Indeed, it appears that the courts ‘reflexively apply lex fori’ even in the 
face of a choice-of-law clause. We could almost say the question is settled.”). 
 50. See Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1120 (“If the [forum selection] clause is 
enforceable, the court may have to answer other questions regarding the meaning, 
scope, and effect of the clause. Examples of such questions are whether the clause 
encompasses pre-contract or non-contractual—in addition to contractual—claims, 
whether it binds non-signatories or other third parties, and whether it confers 
exclusive or nonexclusive jurisdiction to the chosen court—sometimes referred to as 
‘mandatory’ or ‘permissive’ clauses, respectively.”); see also Ashlee Schaller, 
Interpretation of Forum Selection Clauses: A Survey of Select English- and German-Speaking 
Jurisdictions, 44 N.C.J. INT’L L. 117, 119 (2018). For a case that presented multiple 
interpretative issues, see Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 427 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“(1) Is the forum-selection provision mandatory or permissive? . . . (2) Are all of Mr. 
Yavuz’s claims governed by the provision, or only some? . . . (3) Does the clause bind 
Mr. Yavuz with respect to claims against all the defendants, or with respect to only his 
claims against FPM, or perhaps only those against FPM and Mr. Adi?”). 
 51. Despite their significance, many forum selection clauses are not drafted 
clearly. Borchers, supra note 9, at 82–83 (“Some inartful clauses, however, have 
proved especially challenging.”); Clermont, supra note 23, at 646 (“Many more of the 
litigated cases, however, turn on how to interpret these clauses, most often as a result 
of the drafting lawyers’ failings.”). 
 52. Professor Coyle adds a fourth category: whether parties agreed to litigate in 
state or federal court. See Coyle, supra note 2, at 1826. 
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do so?53 (2) Are the claims at issue within the scope of the forum 
selection clause? That is, does the clause require that the particular 
claim or claims be resolved pursuant to the forum selection clause?54 
(3) Is the party resisting enforcement subject to the forum selection 
clause?55 These questions are often dispositive, so a great deal turns 
on how a court chooses to interpret the forum selection clause.56 
Returning to the example above, assume that the plaintiff advances 
a statutory claim in State B, alleging that the claim is not a “dispute[] 
arising out of, or related to, th[e] contract.” The task of State B will 
be to apply some body of law to decide whether the claim falls within 
the scope of the forum selection clause. If State B finds that the claim 
does fall within the scope of the clause, and provided there are no 
other interpretative issues, the court would likely dismiss or transfer 
the action. 
Up until fairly recently, U.S. courts treated issues related to the 
interpretation of forum selection clauses the same way that they 
treated issues of validity and enforceability—that is, they applied 
forum law to all these questions.57 In the 2000s, however, courts 
began to pay a bit more attention to the specific issue of whether 
forum law should be applied to interpret forum selection clauses 
when the parties had selected a different law to govern their 
 
 53. Even though it is surprisingly easy to craft exclusive jurisdiction clauses (i.e., 
simply use the word “exclusive”), many parties fail to draft them clearly. 
 54. Professor Borchers notes that this is “[t]he most frequently-litigated 
[interpretation] issue . . . .” Borchers, supra note 9, at 84. This exercise can get very 
complex. See, e.g., TSI USA, LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-cv-2177-L, 2017 WL 
106835, at *2–3, 7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2017) (applying California law to determine 
whether a forum selection clause survived termination of the contract when not 
mentioned in a survival clause), aff’d, No. 3:16-cv-2177-L, 2017 WL 3209399 (N.D. 
Tex. June 19, 2017). 
 55. “The more difficult question, though, has been the appropriate treatment of 
persons who are parties to the litigation, but not parties to the forum [selection 
clause].” Borchers, supra note 9, at 85; see also Monika L. Woodard, Comment, Ghosts 
Have Rights Too! A New Era in Contractual Rights: Third-Party Invocation in Forum 
Selection Clauses, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 467, 467–69 (2014). 
 56. See, e.g., Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance, 209 F. Supp. 3d 
1147, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“The issue of whether French or federal common law 
governs the interpretation of the forum selection clause in the Policy is 
determinative of whether the clause is valid in the present litigation.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 427 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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dispute.58 One of the first court of appeals cases to examine this issue 
was the 10th Circuit in Yavuz v. 61 MM Ltd.59 The court in Yavuz 
noted that the choice of law issue was one of first impression and had 
received little scholarly or judicial attention in the context of 
international contracts.60 The court held that the forum selection 
clause should be interpreted using Swiss law, the law chosen by the 
parties in their contract,61 reasoning that: 
If the parties to an international contract agree on a forum-
selection clause that has a particular meaning under the law of a 
specific jurisdiction, and the parties agree that the contract is to be 
interpreted under the law of that jurisdiction, then respect for the 
parties’ autonomy and the demands of predictability in international 
transactions require courts to give effect to the meaning of the forum-
selection clause under the chosen law . . . . [W]e now hold that under 
federal law the courts should ordinarily honor an international 
commercial agreement’s forum-selection provision as construed under 
the law specified in the agreement’s choice-of-law provision. The practice, 
although apparently merely reflexive, of applying the law of the 
jurisdiction in which the suit is pending (lex fori), is unsatisfactory.62 
Most other appellate courts that have considered this issue have 
followed the approach endorsed in Yavuz—i.e., using the parties’ 
chosen law to adjudicate matters related to the interpretation of the 
forum selection clause.63 
Professor Symeonides examined recent cases involving the intersection 
between forum selection and choice of law clauses. His results show a very 
clear trend toward applying forum law to issues of validity and 
enforceability, and the parties’ chosen law to issues of interpretation.64 He 
 
 58. Schaller, supra note 50, at 120 (“More specifically, in interpreting forum selection 
clauses, should the court apply the law of the jurisdiction in which it sits (the law of the 
forum) or apply the law chosen by the parties to govern their agreement?”). 
 59. 465 F.3d 418, 427 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 60. Id. at 427. 
 61. Id. at 430–31. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176, 185 (3d Cir. 2017); Barnett v. 
DynCorp Int’l, L.L.C., 831 F.3d 296, 308 (5th Cir. 2016); Albemarle Corp. v. 
AstraZeneca UK, Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 643 (4th Cir. 2010); Dunne v. Libbra 330 F.3d 
1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2003); Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763, 767 
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Brenner v. Nat’l Outdoor Leadership Sch., 20 F. Supp. 3d 709, 718 
(D. Minn. 2014). But see Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 
(9th Cir. 1988) (choosing to use federal law to interpret forum selection clauses). 
 64. Professor Symeonides uses the terms “validity” and “enforceability” 
interchangeably. For an example of a recent case that applied federal law to the issue 
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noted that in 2017, there were nineteen appellate cases that involved the 
intersection between choice of law and choice of forum clauses.65 He 
observed that: (a) Eight cases involved only questions of enforceability 
and they all applied forum law; (b) Six cases involved only questions of 
interpretation, five of them applied the chosen law, and one applied 
forum law; and (c) Five cases involved both interpretation and 
enforceability, two applied forum law to both issues, and three applied 
forum law to questions of enforceability and the chosen law to 
questions of interpretation.66 What these results show is that courts are 
generally applying forum law to issues of validity and enforceability and 
applying the parties’ chosen law to questions of interpretation. Prior to 
analyzing whether this bifurcation between validity and interpretation is 
appropriate, I propose a framework for thinking about the intersection 
between choice of law and choice of forum clauses. 
III.    FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN FORUM SELECTION 
CLAUSES AND CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES 
Because of the complexity of the validity, enforceability, and 
interpretation analysis, it is helpful for courts approaching the confluence 
of choice of law clauses and forum selection clauses to have some sort 
of governing framework for the analysis—that is, some start point and 
some end point.67 Otherwise, the issues all tend to bleed together.68 
Accordingly, I propose the following four-step framework.69 
 
of interpretation, see XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, LC, No. W-16-CA-00447-RP, 
2017 WL 5505340, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2017) (“This Court assumes ‘not only that 
“[f]ederal law governs the determination of whether an enforceable forum selection 
clause exists[,]” but also that federal law controls whether [Plaintiff’s] lawsuit falls 
within the scope of the forum selection clause.’” (citation omitted)). 
 65. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1135. 
 66. Id. at 1135–36. 
 67. Lately, courts have been employing the following four-step framework 
articulated by the Second Circuit in Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383–84 
(2d Cir. 2007): (1) was the clause reasonably communicated to the party resisting 
enforcement; (2) was the clause mandatory or permissive; (3) are the claims at issue 
subject to the forum selection clause; and (4) would enforcement of the clause be 
unreasonable or unjust? Unfortunately, this framework is under-inclusive, as it does 
not include the full gamut of validity and enforceability issues, nor does it reference 
the predicate choice of law questions. 
 68. Schaller, supra note 50, at 120 n.6 (“[M]any courts simply blur the issues of 
enforceability and interpretation of forum selection clauses together into one overall 
analysis.”). 
 69. Although this Article only focuses on Step Three of the proposed framework, it is 
necessary to situate the discussion in the larger context of how the analysis would play out. 
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A.   Step One: Validity and Enforceability of Choice of Law Clause 
First, courts should consider the validity and enforceability of the 
choice of law clause contained in the contract. The validity inquiry 
entails whether the clause is properly formed as a matter of contract 
law, and whether there are any contractual barriers to enforcement 
(e.g., unconscionability).70 Currently, “very few courts focus on the 
question whether the choice-of-law clause is itself enforceable as a 
matter of contract law.”71 But, if there is no valid choice of law clause, 
the “chosen law” will be irrelevant. 
Then, the court must consider whether to enforce the clause as a 
conflict of laws matter. This means that a court will apply section 187 of 
the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws—or whatever other approach 
the forum has adopted—to ensure that it is comfortable enforcing the 
choice of law clause.72 If the choice of law clause is invalid or unenforceable, 
the court must then determine what law to apply both to the underlying 
dispute and to the interpretation of the forum selection clause. 
B.  Step Two: Validity of Forum Selection Clause 
Second, courts must determine the validity of the forum selection 
clause—i.e., is the forum selection clause valid as a matter of contract 
law? As discussed above, the common practice is for a court to apply 
 
 70. See Jillian R. Camarote, Comment, A Little More Contract Law with My Contracts 
Please: The Need to Apply Unconscionability Directly to Choice-of-Law Clauses, 39 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 605, 607 (2009) (arguing that courts need to initially examine the 
choice of law clause as a contractual matter, using the doctrine of unconscionability, 
before embarking on a conflicts analysis). 
 71. William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and 
Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 3 (2006). There is also the open question of what 
law determines whether a choice of law clause is valid. 
 72. Very few courts currently engage in this analysis. For a court that did apply 
section 187, see Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Parties’ 
freedom to choose the law applicable to their agreements is not without boundaries 
in New Jersey law. New Jersey looks to Restatement § 187 to determine under what 
circumstances a choice-of-law clause will not be respected.”). See also TSI USA, LLC, v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 106835, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 
2017), aff’d, No. 3:16-CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 3209399 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2017). Much 
more typical is the approach in Hous. Casualty Co. v. Thomas Linderman Graham, Inc., 
No. 1:17CV40, 2017 WL 3172415, at *2 (M.D.N.C. July 25, 2017) (“‘“[T]he body of 
law selected in an otherwise valid choice-of-law clause” governs the interpretation of 
a forum-selection clause.’ Here, the Agreement selects North Carolina law (Doc. 10–
1 at 2), so the court will apply North Carolina law to determine whether the forum-
selection clause encompasses HCC’s claims.” (citations omitted)). 
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forum law to the issue.73 If the court determines that the forum 
selection clause is invalid, then it will proceed as though no forum 
selection clause was present. Conversely, if a court determines that 
the clause is valid and enforceable, then a court will turn to either 
Step Three (if applicable), or Step Four. 
C.  Step Three: Interpretation of the Forum Selection Clause 
Third, a court must interpret the forum selection clause. This may 
involve determining whether the clause is mandatory or permissive, 
and whether the claim at issue falls within the scope of the clause. Here, 
there is an open question as to whether forum law, or the chosen law, 
should govern. If the chosen law governs, there is an additional step of 
determining what that chosen law is exactly, which, in the international 
context, may require examination of international treaties and involve 
the doctrine of renvoi.74 If the parties have not entered into a choice of 
law clause, a court must decide whether to apply forum law to 
interpretation issues, or whether to conduct a choice of law analysis to 
ascertain the applicable law. In other words, a court faces a choice of law 
analysis whether or not the parties have chosen a governing law. 
D.  Step Four: Effect of Forum Selection Clause 
Fourth, a court must decide what effect to give the forum selection 
clause.75 Here, the exact analysis will differ depending on the litigation 
posture. The most common scenario involves a court other than the one 
chosen in the forum selection clause determining whether it should 
hear the action before it or dismiss/transfer the proceedings in light of 
the forum selection clause.76 If a court determines that the clause is 
mandatory and that the claim falls within the scope of the clause, it will 
 
 73. See supra note 48. 
 74. Some courts might impose a true/false conflict analysis as a predicate to 
applying the chosen law. See Brenner v. Nat’l Outdoor Leadership Sch., 20 F. Supp. 
3d 709, 715 (D. Minn. 2014) (“Because the court finds no conflict between 
Minnesota and Wyoming law on any determinative issue relating to contract validity 
or interpretation, a choice of law need not be made with regard to the first two 
arguments and the court applies Minnesota law.”). 
 75. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 29, at 317 (“The effect of those rights in federal 
court is a question of federal procedural law. As with a § 1404(a) motion, a federal 
court might decide that a valid forum-selection clause does not justify dismissal, and 
it might decide that an invalid clause does.”). 
 76. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 52 (2013). 
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ordinarily “enforce”77 the clause by dismissing or transferring its 
proceedings. If a court determines that the clause is permissive, or 
that it is mandatory but does not encompass the claims at issue, the 
court will need to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the 
claim and whether it should exercise that jurisdiction.78 
*** 
As is apparent from the above, this is not an inquiry for the faint of 
heart. It is an involved, multi-step analysis.79 There are several choice 
of law issues presented by the above: What law should apply to the 
validity and enforceability of a choice of law clause? What law should 
apply to the validity of a forum selection clause? What law should 
apply to interpret a forum selection clause? It seems that the 
overwhelming majority of courts use forum law to gauge the validity 
of both forum selection clauses and choice of law clauses. Courts are 
divided, however, on the question presented at Step Three, what law 
should apply to issues of forum selection clause interpretation.80 
 
 77. Technically, a court is not enforcing the clause. It simply is deciding what 
effect to give the clause in the proceedings before it. 
 78. See Lavera Skin Care N. Am., Inc. v. Laverana GmbH & Co. KG, No. 2:13-CV-
02311-RSM, 2014 WL 7338739, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2014) (“Where a forum-
selection clause is instead permissive, the vast majority of courts that have addressed 
the issue have rejected Atlantic Marine’s application and applied the traditional 
forum non conveniens test.”), aff’d, 696 F. App’x 837 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 
Buxbaum, supra note 23, at 143–44 (“[S]ome courts give no special weight to a 
permissive forum selection clause when considering these motions. Other courts, 
however, recognize a few ways in which the existence of a permissive forum selection 
clause might affect the analysis.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Brenner, 20 F. Supp. at 715 (“Brenner opposes the instant motion and 
argues that (1) the Agreement is invalid because it lacks independent consideration; 
(2) the Agreement and its forum selection clause are unenforceable against her as a 
non-party to the contract and as trustee to Plotkin’s heirs and next-of-kin; (3) the 
forum selection clause is invalid because it is a contract of adhesion and (4) the 
forum selection clause is inapplicable to tort claims. Because the court finds no 
conflict between Minnesota and Wyoming law on any determinative issue relating to 
contract validity or interpretation, a choice of law need not be made with regard to 
the first two arguments and the court applies Minnesota law. As explained below, the 
court applies federal law to the third argument, which concerns enforceability of the 
forum selection clause, and refers to Minnesota law in a limited contract 
interpretation inquiry. Finally, as explained below, the court applies Wyoming law to 
resolve the fourth argument, which relates to interpretation of the forum selection 
clause.” (citations omitted)). 
 80. See Indoor Billboard Nw. Inc. v. M2 Sys. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (D. 
Or. 2013) (“There is a split in the circuits as to the law that a federal court sitting in 
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This Article argues that courts should apply forum law—not the 
parties’ chosen law—to interpretation questions presented by forum 
selection clauses. This position is somewhat against the grain of current 
thinking on the topic, though there are certainly cases that apply forum 
law to questions of interpretation.81 The leading case in this respect is 
Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc.82 In that case, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that federal law should govern all issues related to 
forum selection clauses, including issues of interpretation.83 It reasoned 
that “because enforcement of a forum clause necessarily entails 
interpretation of the clause before it can be enforced, federal law also 
applies to interpretation of forum selection clauses.”84 The Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning for lumping interpretation in with issues of validity 
and enforceability is simply that interpretation is part and parcel of 
enforceability, and thus, all issues should be governed by federal law.85 
Courts following the Ninth Circuit’s lead have used similar logic.86 
 
diversity is to apply to interpret a forum-selection clause when the underlying 
contract contains a choice-of-law provision.”). 
 81. A number of courts refuse to apply the parties’ chosen law to questions of 
interpretation. See Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam); Connex R.R. v. AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1149–50 
(C.D. Cal. 2016); Found. Fitness Prods., LLC v. Free Motion Fitness, 121 F. Supp. 3d 
1038, 1044 (D. Or. 2015); Lavera Skin Care, 2014 WL 7338739, at *5; Indoor Billboard, 
922 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; Kiland v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. C 10-4105 SBA, 2011 WL 
1261130, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011); Sigma Six Techs., Inc. v. Nagarro, Inc., No. C 
08-05633 JW, 2009 WL 2031771, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2009). 
 82. 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 83. Id. at 513. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Sometimes issues of interpretation are, in fact, intertwined with issues of 
validity and enforceability. TSI USA, LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2177-L, 
2017 WL 106835, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2012) (argument that forum selection 
clause applied only during life of the contract and not after termination could be 
characterized as issue of scope of the clause or validity of the clause), aff’d, No. 3:16-
CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 3209399 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2017). 
 86. Wong v. Partygaming, Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 827–28 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that “six Circuits have held that the enforceability of a forum selection clause 
implicates federal procedure and should therefore be governed by federal law” 
including the 9th Circuit); Avicenna Laser Tech., Inc. v. Nathaniel Grp., Inc., No. 05-
60996-CIV, 2005 WL 8154578, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2005) (“[D]etermining the 
proper forum through the forum-selection clause is a procedural issue, even if it 
involves principles of contract law. Accordingly, federal law applies and the Court 
need not venture further into choice-of-law and Erie matters.”). 
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The reasoning in Manetti-Farrow is not particularly detailed or 
persuasive,87 but this Article nonetheless maintains that applying 
forum law is, in fact, the better course of action. This is because there 
are no compelling reasons to apply the parties’ chosen law to the 
issue, and to apply the chosen law only creates the potential for 
additional confusion and complication to result from this inquiry. 
This is particularly so when the parties have chosen foreign law to 
govern their contract.88 Accordingly, the remainder of this Article 
provides less of an affirmative argument for applying forum law, and 
more of an argument against applying the chosen law. 
IV.  EXAMINING THE STATED RATIONALES FOR APPLYING THE      
CHOSEN LAW 
Courts and commentators provide several reasons why forum 
selection clauses should be interpreted in accordance with the 
parties’ chosen law.89 First, they posit that a choice of law clause is an 
 
 87. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 23, at 660 (“But in fact, there is no logical 
compulsion to first determine what precisely a forum-selection clause means without 
looking to the chosen law. A court could logically look to the chosen law to see what 
the forum-selection clause means as to its coverage, and then apply lex fori to 
determine whether the construed clause is enforceable.”). 
 88. Where the parties have chosen the law of a different U.S. state, it generally 
will not matter whether a court applies federal, forum, or chosen law to the dispute 
since the interpretative principles are very similar. See Prestige Oilfield Servs., LLC v. 
Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. CV 18-1173 GBW/GJF, 2019 WL 764669, at *3 (D.N.M. 
Feb. 21, 2019) (“In any event, the resolution of this Motion is governed by general 
principles of contract interpretation. Neither party has cited to cases suggesting that 
these principles are inapplicable, or applied differently, under the choice of law they 
respectively champion—Oklahoma or federal common law. Thus, even if the choice-
of-Oklahoma-law provision did not apply, application of these general principles 
would mandate the same result.”); Hunnicutt v. CHF Sols., Inc., No. 10-CV-0042-CVE-
FHM, 2010 WL 1078470, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2010) (“The Court need not 
resolve this issue because federal, Minnesota, and Oklahoma law regarding forum 
selection clauses are substantially similar, and the interpretation and application of the 
forum selection clause would not change based on the choice of law.”); Raydiant Tech., 
LLC v. Fly-N-Hog Media Grp., 439 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (“Both parties 
cited Missouri case law in the trial court and did the same here. It was acknowledged at 
oral argument, however, that the contract expressly provides that it is governed by 
Arkansas law, such that we may need to consider that state’s law instead . . . . Thus we look 
to Arkansas law, but would reach the same result under Missouri law.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 23, at 661 (“First, there is the background 
policy of indulging party autonomy unless inappropriate. Second, there are the other 
usual arguments in favor of giving the parties the power to choose the governing law, 
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expression of party autonomy, and that parties should have the right 
to choose which law governs the interpretation of the forum selection 
clause in their contract. Second, and somewhat related, courts and 
scholars maintain that interpreting a forum selection clause in 
accordance with the chosen law respects the intentions of the parties. 
Third, they argue that outcomes are more certain and predictable if 
courts interpret forum selection clauses pursuant to the chosen law. 
Fourth, courts and commentators assert that the interpretation of a 
forum selection clause is a substantive (versus a procedural) issue, to 
be determined in accordance with the parties’ chosen law. Fifth, they 
maintain that since a forum selection clause is “part of” the contract, 
there is no principled reason for singling it out for application of a 
law other than the chosen law. Finally, they argue that interpreting a 
forum selection clause in accordance with the parties’ chosen law 
avoids forum shopping. Upon closer examination, none of these 
rationales hold up. 
A.   The Party Autonomy Argument 
One of the rationales provided in support of applying the parties’ 
chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause is that party autonomy 
dictates that the parties should be free to select the law to govern all 
aspects of their relationship. Indeed, Professor Yackee argues that all 
issues regarding enforceability and interpretation should be left to the 
law chosen by the parties: “[t]he routine enforcement of choice of law 
clauses, and indeed the wide acceptance of the more general principle 
of ‘party autonomy’ in [business to business] contracting generally, 
suggests that courts should turn first and foremost to the law that the 
parties have explicitly selected to govern their relationship.”90 
The party autonomy argument, however, suffers from one major 
weakness: parties do not have unfettered autonomy to select whatever 
law they wish to govern their contractual relationship. American courts 
have imposed limits on party choice. For instance, section 187 of the 
 
such as curbing forum shopping. Third, there is the argument that the forum-
selection clause should have the same interpretation everywhere . . . .”). 
 90. Yackee, supra note 40, at 84; see also J. Zachary Courson, Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.: 
A New Federal Standard—Applying Contracting Parties’ Choice of Law to the Analysis of 
Forum Selection Agreements, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 597, 597 (2008) (“Parties doing 
business abroad face the very real prospect of litigating, unexpectedly, in foreign 
courts under foreign law. Forum selection agreements and choice of law clauses 
theoretically grant parties autonomy to predetermine the courts in which they will 
litigate, as well as the law under which they will litigate.”). 
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Restatement (Second) on the Conflict of Laws circumscribes the ability of 
the parties to choose the law governing their agreement.91 Under this 
section, the parties are not permitted to derogate from mandatory 
law by way of a choice of law clause where the chosen law has no 
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction, where there 
is no other reasonable basis for the parties choice, or where 
application of the chosen law would be contrary to the public policy 
of the law of the state that would apply absent a choice of law clause.92 
Moreover, parties are not permitted to choose a law to govern the 
validity of a forum selection clause, even if they expressly indicate 
such an intention in their contract. Many forum selection clauses 
provide that the chosen law will govern all issues arising from or 
related to the contract, including issues of whether a contract was validly 
formed.93 Yet, U.S. courts have deliberately ignored such language, 
characterizing issues of validity as a procedural matter to be governed by 
the law of the forum, irrespective of the intentions of the parties. 
For the purpose of this Article, the point is simply that invoking 
party autonomy as a reason to apply the parties’ chosen law is not as 
compelling as it may seem at first blush. This is because party 
autonomy is already circumscribed by a forum’s choice of law rules, 
and its characterization of the validity of a forum selection clause as a 
procedural rather than substantive matter. 
B.   The Parties’ Intentions Argument 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in favor of having the chosen 
law govern the interpretation of a forum selection clause is the parties’ 
intentions argument: “To ensure that the meaning given to a forum 
selection clause corresponds with the parties’ legitimate expectations, 
 
 91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187 (1971). 
 92. Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. 
L. REV. 363, 372–73 (2003) (“Thus, section 187 explicitly authorizes letting the 
contract override a mandatory law that would apply under the default choice-of-law 
rule where there is a ‘reasonable basis’ for the contractual choice, unless the law of 
the nonchosen state represents ‘fundamental policy’ and the nonchosen state ‘has a 
materially greater interest’ than the chosen state in determining the issue.”). 
 93. McLarty Capital Partners SBIC, L.P. v. Brazda, No. 18CV2599 (DLC), 2018 
WL 3104093, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2018) (“The validity, interpretation and 
enforcement of this agreement . . . shall be governed by the laws of the State of New 
York . . . .”); AlliantGroup, L.P. v. Mols, No. CV H-16-3114, 2017 WL 432810, at *2 
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2017) (“Choice of Law/Jurisdiction/Venue: This Agreement shall be 
governed in all respects, including, but not limited to, validity, interpretation, effect 
and performance by the laws of the State of Texas.”). 
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courts must apply the law contractually chosen by the parties to interpret 
the clause.”94 Nearly all courts that apply the parties’ chosen law advance 
some version of this argument.95 While the argument certainly sounds 
good in theory—after all, who can be against giving effect to the will of the 
parties in matters of contract law?—it does not hold up to closer scrutiny. 
First, the argument meets a significant roadblock right at the outset. If 
it is true that parties “intend” to have forum selection clauses interpreted 
in accordance with the chosen law, then surely it is true that the parties 
also “intend” to have matters related to validity of the forum selection 
clause also governed by the chosen law. That is, it is silly to bifurcate 
validity issues and interpretation issues and to simply declare that the 
parties must have intended the latter to be governed by the chosen law. 
Either the parties intended everything related to the contract—validity, 
enforceability, interpretation—to be governed by the chosen law, or they 
did not. Yet, as discussed above, when it comes to validity and 
enforceability of the forum selection clause, the overwhelming majority 
of courts proceed to apply forum law, not the parties’ chosen law.96 
Seldom is a word said about the parties’ intentions in this respect, even 
though many choice of law clauses expressly manifest the parties’ 
intentions that issues of validity should be governed by the chosen law. It is 
disingenuous for courts to invoke the parties’ intentions when the issue 
involves the interpretation of a forum selection clause, but to disregard 
the matter entirely when it comes to validity and enforceability issues. 
Second, the parties’ intentions argument must be considered in 
light of the specific context in which it arises. Usually, a forum other 
than the one selected in the forum selection clause is being asked to 
determine whether it should proceed with the litigation notwithstanding 
the clause. As part of this inquiry, the forum will need to examine the 
validity and enforceability of the clause and possibly grapple with 
issues of contractual interpretation. As indicated, the trend now is for 
 
 94. Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 2014); see also 
Clermont, supra note 23, at 661 (“One could defend this rule by interpreting the forum-
selection clause as an implicit choice-of-law clause for matters relating to the forum-
selection clause itself or as the best way to conform to the parties’ expectations.”). 
 95. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Thus, when the 
contract contains a choice-of-law clause, a court can effectuate the parties’ agreement 
concerning the forum only if it interprets the forum clause under the chosen law.”); 
EnQuip Techs. Grp. v. Tycon Technoglass S.R.I., 986 N.E.2d 469, 479 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2012) (“Interpreting [the forum selection clause] under the parties’ chosen law . . . 
honors the parties’ agreement . . . .”). 
 96. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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the forum to apply the chosen law to these latter issues, in part 
because that must have been the intention of the parties. What the 
parties intended, however, was that the chosen forum would apply the 
chosen law.97 They did not necessarily intend that a forum unilaterally 
selected by one party (ostensibly in contravention of an exclusive forum 
selection clause98) would apply the chosen law. In fact, if one surveyed 
the parties on this point, they might actually prefer for a court that is not 
nominated in a forum selection clause to apply its own law to issues of 
contractual interpretation.99 
Third, the parties’ intentions argument appears to be largely an ex 
post facto academic justification for applying the chosen law to 
interpret forum selection clauses. It is a stretch to believe that the 
parties “intended” to have issues of interpretation of forum selection 
clauses governed by the chosen law. To say that the parties 
“intended” something would imply that the parties considered the 
issue and deliberately took steps to memorialize their understanding. 
Contracting parties are primarily concerned with memorializing the 
key details of their contract.100 Much of the rest is boilerplate. The 
parties, or most likely their lawyers, cut and paste some standard 
clauses into the contract (a forum selection clause and a choice of law 
clause among them) and then hope for the best.101 It is extremely 
 
 97. Indirect support for this proposition is found in Professor Coyle’s empirical 
study concerning the interpretation of forum selection clauses. He notes that some 
survey “respondents who preferred exclusive clauses reported that it was important to 
them that the chosen forum and the chosen law be the same and that the only way to 
guarantee this outcome was to make the forum selection clause exclusive.” Coyle, 
supra note 2, at 1837. 
 98. I say “ostensibly” because this is often one of the issues that the court will 
need to decide—i.e., whether the clause is, in fact, exclusive or non-exclusive. 
 99. This preference may be revealed by the fact that parties often do not raise the 
possibility of the chosen law governing the interpretation of a forum selection clause. 
 100. Woodward, supra note 71, at 18 (“Moreover, it’s far more likely that the main 
features of the contract—the product description, price, and other features—will 
attract nearly all of their attention.”). 
 101. Coyle, supra note 2, at 1794 (“Courts called upon to interpret forum selection 
clauses confront a singular challenge—namely, the words and phrases in these 
clauses are usually non-negotiated boilerplate. While the contracting parties will 
typically dicker over the identity of the chosen forum--whether litigation must 
proceed in New York or Texas, for example—they will rarely give much thought to 
the other words in their forum selection clause.”); see also Espresso Disposition Corp. 
1 v. Santana Sales & Mktg. Grp., 105 So. 3d 592, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) 
(noting that the appellee urged the court not to enforce forum selection clause 
based on its error in cutting and pasting the clause from another agreement). 
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doubtful that the parties to any contract have ever given any real 
thought to the question of what law they would want for a court not 
nominated in their contract to use in interpreting the forum selection 
clause contained in their contract. The sentiment is aptly articulated 
by Professor Coyle: 
When the contract language consists of non-negotiated boilerplate, 
however, an inquiry into the actual intent of the specific parties to 
a particular agreement will rarely turn up useful. The parties are 
using the same language as have thousands of other parties in 
thousands of other contracts. In such cases, it is difficult for the 
courts to credibly maintain that they are giving effect to the intent 
of these particular parties to this particular contract. They are 
instead assigning a meaning to the language that—they hope—is 
broadly in line with what most other parties using that same 
language would want it to mean.102 
One other point is worth exploring. Above, I have referred to party 
intentions as though the parties were on equal terms. In many 
contracts, and certainly in consumer contracts, the parties lack equal 
bargaining power. Accordingly, the stronger party will dictate the 
terms of the contract, including any choice of forum or choice of law 
clause.103 As Professor Woodward explains, “any full understanding of 
what a choice-of-forum clause means in rational choice terms is likely 
to be absent from the vast run of people who receive forms.”104 So, at 
least in these sorts of cases, it does not make much sense to talk about 
the parties’ intentions, plural. Rather, we are simply talking about 
what the intention is of the stronger party, who was able to get the 
weaker party to accede to his terms.105 Given all this, it seems that 
invoking party intentions as a justification for applying the chosen law 
to interpret a forum selection clause is a bit of a stretch. The reality is 
the parties intend for the “best” law to govern their forum selection 
clause—and the best law for the plaintiff will differ from the best law 
for the defendant. The idea that the parties intended something at 
the time of contract formation is nothing but fiction. 
 
 102. Coyle, supra note 2, at 1794. 
 103. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1155. 
 104. Woodward, supra note 71, at 18. 
 105. Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party 
Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123, 140 (2008) (“With regard to the choice of law 
provision in an adhesion contract, the adherent’s signature on the contract by no 
means implies that the adherent’s choice is meaningful.”). 
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C.   The Certainty Argument 
Courts and commentators also argue that applying the parties’ 
chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause promotes certainty 
and predictability, two virtues that are particularly important for 
contracting parties. Strangely, though, it is hard to pin down the 
certainty and predictability arguments with any level of specificity.106 
It seems that the certainty and predictability arguments are twofold: 
(1) if courts were to apply the chosen law—rather than forum law—
to questions of interpretation, then the result should be the same 
regardless of where suit is initiated (“the uniformity argument”); and 
(2) given that ultimate questions of contractual interpretation will be 
governed by the chosen law, it would seem more consistent to apply 
the chosen law to the interpretation of the forum selection clause so 
as to avoid any anomalous results (“the consistency argument”). Each 
of these rationales suffers from inherent weaknesses. 
The uniformity argument essentially posits that “the forum-
selection clause should have the same interpretation everywhere; we 
do not want the clause to mean one thing here and another thing 
there.”107 The uniformity argument rests on the unstated assumption 
that each court in which litigation could conceivably be filed would 
apply the parties’ chosen law to questions of interpretation, and apply 
 
 106. For instance, Professor Clermont simply provides a point form list of the 
certainty and predictability arguments in favor of applying the parties’ chosen law to 
govern forum selection clauses, without much explanation: 
[(a)] Applying the chosen law to the forum-selection clause fits the modern 
indulgence of party autonomy, and so efficiently facilitates private ordering, 
conforms to expectations, and increases certainty; [(b)] Otherwise, the law 
will vary with the court selected by the plaintiff, and so the parties will not be 
sure what law will apply on the forum-selection clause and, hence, what law 
will apply to the rest of the lawsuit; [(c)] The lack of predictability would be 
especially detrimental in international commercial contracts. 
Clermont, supra note 23, at 656. Professor Yackee equally does not provide much 
explanation for how applying the parties’ chosen law promotes certainty. See Yackee, 
supra note 40, at 84–85 (“This principle—that the explicitly selected law should 
govern the [forum selection agreement]—has multiple advantages over a default 
reliance on lex fori. Because most international [business to business] contracts will 
contain a choice of law clause, the principle covers most international [forum selection 
agreement] disputes. The principle also respects party autonomy and maintains the unity 
of the contract by assuring that the same law is applied to different contract 
provisions.”); see also Courson, supra note 90, at 597 (“This new autonomy-based 
approach is in line with the increasingly party-centered world of transnational trade and 
provides foreseeability and certainty in international transactions.”). 
 107. Clermont, supra note 23, at 661. 
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it in the same way. This is an unrealistic assumption. Even within the 
United States, it is unlikely that all states would get “on board” with 
applying the chosen law to interpretative questions posed by forum 
selection clauses. When one considers the myriad of non-U.S. forums 
where litigants may initiate disputes, the goal for uniformity through 
application of the chosen law becomes a pipe dream.108 But even if all 
states were to apply the chosen law to questions of forum selection 
clause interpretation, this still would not greatly advance the goal for 
predictability and certainty. This is because the chosen law would be 
interpreted not by the chosen court, but instead by a court unilaterally 
selected by one of the parties. There will certainly be disparities in how a 
given court will apply the law of another state or another country to 
interpretation issues presented by a forum selection clause.109 
The consistency argument is even more attenuated than the 
uniformity argument. The argument is basically that we do not want a 
word or phrase having one meaning in the context of a forum 
selection clause and then a different meaning elsewhere in the 
contract.110 Thus, this argument rests on the following factual predicates: 
(a) there is a word or phrase used in a forum selection clause that 
requires interpretation; (b) that same word or phrase is used somewhere 
else in the contract; (c) that word or phrase somewhere else in the 
contract also requires interpretation; and (d) that word or phrase 
somewhere else in the contract that also requires interpretation would 
be interpreted in accordance with the chosen law, which would differ 
 
 108. Maxwell J. Wright, Note, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses: An Examination of the 
Current Disarray of Federal Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and A Proposal for Judicial 
Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1625, 1627 (2011) (noting that “whether a clause is 
enforceable, and the appropriate procedural mechanisms with which to enforce it, will 
depend on the particular federal court in which the suit is filed. Thus, the federal system 
completely undermines one of the central purposes of forum-selection clauses—to 
provide predictability, stability, and foreseeability to a contractual relationship”). 
 109. Consider the fact that federal courts applying federal law to questions of the 
enforceability of a forum selection clause have reached very different results. See 
Borchers, supra note 9, at 101 (“In attempting to apply the Bremen criteria courts 
arrived at substantially divergent results. This is problematic because not only does it 
produce some unacceptable results, it greatly reduces the value of forum selection 
agreements as a tool of economic planning.”). 
 110. Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 2014) (“If ‘the 
interpretation of a forum selection clause [were] singled out for application of any 
law other than that chosen to govern the interpretation of the contract as a whole,’ 
then the same word or phrase could have a different meaning in the forum selection 
clause than it has elsewhere in the same contract.” (citation omitted)). 
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from how a court interpreted that word or phrase in the forum selection 
clause if it used forum law. There are likely very few cases where this 
would be an issue. The very unique nature of the potential “problem” 
suggests that this should not be used as a justification for applying the 
parties’ chosen law to the interpretation question. 
D.   The Substance/Procedure Argument 
Several courts and scholars have relied on the distinction between 
substance and procedure to support the practice of applying the parties’ 
chosen law to questions of forum selection clause interpretation. For 
instance, Professor Symeonides argues that “not many people would 
question that the interpretation of [forum selection] clauses—like the 
interpretation of a contract—is a ‘quintessentially substantive’ question. 
Consequently, like any other substantive question, it should not be 
answered by the law of the forum qua forum.”111 
The substance/procedure divide is not particularly helpful in 
advancing the discussion. Professor Symeonides asserts that the 
interpretation of forum selection clauses is a “quintessentially substantive” 
matter.112 Perhaps it is. But so too is the very validity of a forum selection 
clause. What can be more substantive than determining whether or not 
a contract (or a clause contained therein) was validly formed? 
Professors Roosevelt and Jones, for instance, argue that “[s]ince [a 
forum selection clause] is a substantive contractual provision, there is 
no obvious reason why its validity should be determined by any law 
other than the one that governs the rest of the contract.”113 Despite the 
fact that questions of validity appear to be substantive in nature—i.e., 
related to the substance of the parties’ rights and obligations—courts 
have repeatedly characterized these questions as procedural.114 
Accordingly, courts resort to forum law, not the parties’ chosen law, to 
test the validity of forum selection clauses. These courts reason that 
 
 111. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1152. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 29, at 316. 
 114. TSI USA, LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 106835, at 
*2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2017) (citation omitted) (“In Barnett v. DynCorp International, 
L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit observed that ‘the “validity” of a forum selection clause is 
[arguably] a matter of substantive contract law,’ in which case, courts apply the body 
of law dictated by a state law’s choice-of-law rules. But the Court of Appeals also 
noted that ‘validity is [arguably] just part of the federal law of enforceability, which 
heavily favors forum-selection clauses.’”), aff’d, No. 3:16-CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 3209399 
(N.D. Tex. June 19, 2017). 
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because such clauses implicate venue, they are considered procedural in 
nature.115 This characterization illustrates the inherent malleability of 
the substance/procedure dichotomy and explains why some authors have 
observed that the “substance-procedure characterization is murky and 
unsatisfying within traditional choice of law.”116 
The point here is simply that using the substance/procedure 
framework to say that issues of validity or enforceability are procedural 
(and therefore governed by forum law) and issues of interpretation are 
substantive (and therefore governed by chosen law) is not a meaningful 
exercise. Both can persuasively be characterized as either substantive or 
procedural because of the inherent malleability of these labels.117 
E.   Miscellaneous Arguments: The “Part of the Contract” Argument and the 
Forum Shopping Argument 
There are two other arguments that are sometimes advanced in 
support of applying the parties’ chosen law: (1) the forum selection 
clause is part of the contract and, like all other parts of the contract, 
should be interpreted in accordance with the chosen law, and (2) if 
courts do not apply the parties’ chosen law, this will encourage forum 
shopping. What these two arguments have in common is that they 
 
 115. Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(“These cases apply federal common law favoring the enforcement of forum 
selection clauses when interpreting contracts that contain forum selection clauses, 
because forum selection clauses implicate the appropriate venue of a court. The 
appropriate venue of an action is a procedural matter that is governed by federal rule 
and statutes. Thus, when a court is analyzing a forum selection clause, which changes 
the default venue rules applicable to the agreement, that court will apply federal law 
and in doing so, give effect to the parties’ agreement.”) (citation omitted). But see 
EnQuip Techs. Grp. v. Tycon Technoglass S.R.I., 986 N.E.2d 469, 476 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2012) (“But the conventional application of the substance-procedure dichotomy to 
forum-selection matters is problematic. It fails to recognize that the ‘forum-selection 
matter’ is composed of at least two discrete, though interrelated, issues, only one of 
which is procedural. One issue is how to interpret the forum-selection clause. This is 
a substantive issue concerned with what the clause means. The other issue is whether 
to enforce the clause. Only this issue is truly procedural because only when a court 
enforces a forum-selection clause does the forum change. A court could interpret the 
clause and then decide not to enforce it.”). 
 116. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 29, at 309. 
 117. Id. at 315 (“It is not surprising that characterization of forum-selection 
clauses is difficult within the conventional Erie framework. From an issue-based, 
abstract perspective, forum-selection clauses look procedural: they are about the 
conduct of litigation. Yet they are also arguably outcome-determinative: choice of 
forum can affect choice of law and hence alter the parties’ substantive rights.”). 
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tend to be “throwaway” arguments that appear as an afterthought to 
the core rationales for applying the parties’ chosen law. 
First, courts reason that “[a] forum-selection clause is part of the 
contract. We see no particular reason . . . why a forum-selection 
clause . . . should be singled out as a provision not to be interpreted 
in accordance with the law chosen by the contracting parties.”118 This 
argument once again fails to recognize that forums legitimately apply 
forum law to determine the validity and enforceability of various 
clauses, including choice of law clauses and forum selection clauses. 
If we were to follow the logic above, a court should apply the parties’ 
chosen law to determine whether a choice of law clause—which is, after 
all, part of the contract—is enforceable. Yet, because we recognize that 
the forum should have control over certain preliminary matters, we are 
comfortable allowing some portions of the contract being governed by 
law other than that selected in a choice of law clause. 
Second, proponents of applying the parties’ chosen law to 
interpret a forum selection clause argue that to do otherwise would 
promote forum shopping.119 The argument goes as follows: a party 
looking to avoid an exclusive forum selection clause will look for a 
forum that interprets such clauses restrictively, such that it will 
continue to hear the case notwithstanding the forum selection clause. 
Forum shopping is often invoked as a policy rationale for or against a 
certain position. The reality is that litigants are always going to forum 
shop—because that is what litigants do. Forum shopping is dictated 
by a plethora of factors;120 very low on that totem pole of factors is 
 
 118. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 119. See Yackee, supra note 40, at 83 (listing the potential for forum shopping as 
one of the reasons not to apply forum law to determine validity of forum selection 
clause); see also Clermont, supra note 23, at 656 (“Applying the chosen law, rather 
than lex fori, to the forum-selection clause closes the door to abusive forum 
shopping: the plaintiff could be undermining the agreement by choosing a court 
that will treat the clauses in a way that favors the plaintiff.”). Note that both of these 
authors were referring to the validity of a forum selection clause, though the arguments 
apply equally to interpretation questions. See Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430 (citing Professor 
Yackee’s argument about forum shopping to support the argument that the parties’ 
chosen law should be applied to interpret the forum selection clause). 
 120. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 345–46 (2006) 
(“Forum shopping is not one act or course of conduct but instead encompasses a 
variety of factors and choices. This Part describes the five basic, and overlapping, 
types of decision making considerations inherent in forum selection: (1) choices 
involving federal courts versus state courts; (2) choices involving courts in different 
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whether the chosen court would apply forum versus chosen law to 
interpret a forum selection clause. 
As discussed above, the justifications for applying the parties’ chosen 
law to interpret a forum selection clause are not particularly convincing. 
And there is a significant downside to using the parties’ chosen law to 
interpret forum selection clauses: it is far too complicated at far too early 
a stage of litigation. It is to that issue that I now turn. 
V.    ADDITIONAL REASONS TO NOT APPLY THE CHOSEN LAW 
Recall that issues of forum selection and choice of law arise at the 
outset of litigation. To require a court to delve into a potentially 
complex morass of foreign law in order to decide a threshold issue 
that it is fully equipped to answer does not make much sense.121 This 
is particularly so given that the court will already be applying forum 
law to other preliminary questions, such as the validity and 
enforceability of the forum selection clause.122 For the sake of 
simplicity—and because there are no powerful arguments to the 
contrary—I suggest that interpretation questions presented by a 
forum selection clause be governed by forum law. This is especially 
important when the chosen law is foreign law, as opposed to the law 
of another state. Below, I examine the additional problems and 
complications that arise when courts apply the parties’ chosen law to 
 
states; (3) choices involving different substantive laws; (4) choices involving different 
procedural provisions; and (5) choices involving subjective and personal factors.”). 
 121. Surprisingly, Judge Posner writes that “[s]implicity argues for determining 
the validity and meaning of a forum selection clause, in a case in which interests 
other than those of the parties will not be significantly affected by the choice of 
which law is to control, by reference to the law of the jurisdiction whose law governs 
the rest of the contract in which the clause appears rather than making the court 
apply two different bodies of law in the same case.” Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. 
Co., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). It is hard to understand 
how it is simpler to use foreign law (rather than forum law) to decide questions of 
validity and interpretation. 
 122. Fendi S.r.l. v. Condotti Shops, Inc., 754 So. 2d 755, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2000) (“If we were to adopt [defendant]’s position, Florida courts would be required 
to apply the law of the forum to determine the validity of a choice of law clause, while 
applying the law of a different jurisdiction to determine the validity of a forum 
selection clause. Such a procedure would often result in divergent outcomes and 
would require our already overburdened trial courts to engage in the complicated 
task of interpreting and applying the law of a foreign jurisdiction.”). Even though the 
Fendi court’s statements were made in the context of ascertaining the validity of a 
forum selection clause, they apply with equal force to questions of interpretation. 
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issues of interpretation, focusing largely on when that chosen law is 
the law of another country. 
A.   What Law Applies? 
In a typical choice of law clause, the parties will provide something 
to the effect that “any and all disputes arising under this agreement 
shall be governed by X law.” The analysis envisioned is that if an 
interpretation question arises, such as whether a particular issue is 
captured under the moniker of “any and all disputes,” the forum will 
turn to X law to decide this threshold issue. If the dispute is 
encapsulated within the clause, as determined by the forum applying 
the chosen law, then the forum can proceed with the rest of its 
analysis.123 But what exactly is X law? 
If the parties have selected the law of another U.S. state, then the 
analysis should be fairly straightforward. However, if the parties have 
chosen the law of a foreign country, particularly a country that is a 
signatory to a relevant convention or treaty, problems are likely to 
arise right at the outset. A U.S. court will need to decide whether to 
apply the chosen forum’s internal law, or its treaty/convention law. 
For instance, assume that the parties have chosen Austrian law to 
govern their contractual dispute and have nominated Austria as the 
exclusive forum for the resolution of all contractual disputes. The 
plaintiff sues in New York in contravention of the clause. A New York 
court will apply Austrian law to any interpretation questions presented 
by the forum selection clause, such as whether a given dispute falls 
within the ambit of the clause. But it is unclear what “Austrian law” is: Is 
it domestic Austrian law? Or, is it Brussels Regulation law because 
Austria is a signatory to the Brussels Regulation?124 Or, is it the Hague 
 
 123. For instance, the forum may then determine that because the dispute is 
captured under a forum selection clause nominating a different court, the forum 
should dismiss the case and thereby “give effect” to the forum selection clause. 
 124. Recently, the E.U. enacted the Brussels Regulation (recast), which 
supplanted the previous version of the Brussels Regulation. Regulation (EU) 
1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2012 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu 
/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:351:0001:0032:en:PDF [https://perma. 
cc/64AU-MTST]. All subsequent references are to the recast Regulation, unless the 
context dictates otherwise. 
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Choice of Court Convention because Austria is in the European Union 
(E.U.), and the European Union has ratified the Convention?125 
The sheer complexity of the initial determination of what body of 
law to apply is illustrated by Li v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London,126 a recent New York federal case where the parties agreed that 
“Swiss Law” applied.127 The parties could not agree, however, “which 
particular body of Swiss law applie[d].”128 Initially, the parties agreed 
that the Lugano Convention governed questions of interpretation 
because Switzerland was a signatory to the Convention.129 However, the 
parties disagreed on what specific provisions within the Convention 
would be applicable—the provisions dealing with contracts in general, 
or the provisions dealing with insurance contracts in particular.130 After 
oral argument, the defendants changed course and argued that the 
Lugano Convention was not applicable to the dispute.131 Instead, they 
argued that the Swiss Private International Law Act of December 18, 
 
 125. Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-
7318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z5B-RWMY]. The Hague 
Choice of Court Convention is in force in the E.U., Mexico, and Singapore. The 
United States has signed the Convention but has not ratified it. See Status Table 37: 
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH, https://www.hcch. 
net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 [https://perma.cc/VR38-
329V]. On whether the Brussels Regulation or the Hague Choice of Court 
Convention applies, see ALFONSO CODÓN ALAMEDA ET AL., CHOICE OF COURT 
AGREEMENTS UNDER BRUSSELS I RECAST REGULATION 5 (2013), http://www.ejtn.eu/ 
Documents/Themis%20Luxembourg/Written_paper_Spain1.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/BUF5-R96V] (“Since Brussels I Recast and the Hague Convention both regulate 
jurisdiction in cases regarding agreements conferring jurisdiction, it is necessary to 
decide which instrument applies in a given case. This issue is dealt with in Article 26 
of the Convention. Brussels I Recast will always be applied if both parties in the 
agreement are domiciled in a Member State of the European Union; if one or both 
parties to the agreement are domiciled in a State party that is not a EU Member State 
the Convention becomes applicable. If the parties are domiciled in a State or in 
States that are neither State parties to the Convention nor EU Member States and 
the court of a member State is chosen the Recast governs.”). 
 126. 183 F. Supp. 3d 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 127. Id. at 356–57. 
 128. Id. at 356. 
 129. Id.; see Lugano Convention of 30 October 2007 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2007 
O.J. (L 339) 3 [hereinafter Lugano Convention], https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22007A1221(03)&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/HF8L-VFQ2]. 
 130. Li, 183 F. Supp. 3d at 356. 
 131. Id. at 356–57. 
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1987 and the Swiss Federal Law on Insurance Contracts were the 
applicable reference points for Swiss law.132 The parties then 
submitted expert affidavits in an effort to assist the court in figuring 
out what “Swiss law” was.133 As Li illustrates, interpreting a forum 
selection clause in accordance with the parties’ chosen law often 
involves the very difficult question of what exactly that law is. 
Where there is a patchwork of domestic and treaty law to consider, 
the exercise becomes an extremely complicated one. And this exercise is 
conducted simply to determine what body of law to apply. After that is 
determined, a court must turn to the equally cumbersome task of 
deciding what foreign law says on the relevant issues and how to apply 
that foreign law to the forum selection clause in question. 
The Lugano Convention at issue in Li is the treaty by which certain 
European countries, including Switzerland, were brought into the 
fold of the Brussels Regulation, the treaty that governs the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the European 
Union.134 Accordingly, it is more common in the U.S. case law to see 
references to the Brussels Regulation. Many U.S. courts have held that the 
Brussels Regulation supplants national law when the parties have chosen 
the law of a country that is a signatory to the Brussels Regulation.135 
Accordingly, a U.S. court applying the law of an E.U. Member State often 
has resort to Brussels Regulation law and not national law.136 
 
 132. Id. at 357. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Schaller, supra note 50, at 127–28 (“The Lugano Convention is a treaty 
between the European Community, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of 
Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Swiss Confederation. Like the Brussels I 
Regulation, the Lugano Convention also generally requires the enforcement of 
jurisdiction clauses between parties to the convention.”). 
 135. Note that whether a U.S. court should apply internal foreign law or Brussels 
Regulation law is often hotly contested. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reargument Of The 
Court’s Memorandum Opinion Decided May 23, 2019 at 8, Germaninvestments AG 
v. Allomet Corp., No. 2018-0666-JRS, 2019 WL 2404888 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019) 
(“Under Professor Doctor Czernich’s analysis obtained to analyze the Opinion, no 
Defendant is a citizen of an EU member state and this Court is not in an EU member 
state. Thus, under Article 6 of the Brussels Regulation, the determination of whether 
the ‘parties intended otherwise’ regarding the exclusive or permissive nature of 
Section 9 of the R&L Agreement for purposes of Article 25 of the Brussels 
Regulation will be determined by domestic Austrian law . . . .”). 
 136. The analysis is actually even more complicated, since there are four private 
international law instruments operating within the E.U.: the Brussels Regulation, the 
Rome I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Choice of Court 
Agreement. See Schaller, supra note 50, at 129–30; see also ALAMEDA, supra note 125, at 
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The analysis, though, is more than a little awkward since U.S. 
courts are essentially applying a treaty in the abstract. The Brussels 
Regulation ordinarily applies only if the defendant in an action is 
domiciled in a Member State.137 There is an exception, however, for 
jurisdiction agreements: if parties to an action designate a Member 
State to hear their dispute, the courts of that Member State will have 
jurisdiction and any resultant judgment will be enforceable across all 
Member States.138 The jurisdiction agreement is presumed to be 
exclusive.139 The key, though, is that the Brussels Regulation only “kicks 
in” if the courts of a Member State are chosen as the forum for the 
resolution of disputes and proceedings are before the courts of that 
Member State or another Member State.140 The Regulation has no 
application outside of this context. Simply choosing a Member State’s 
“law” does not mean that the Brussels Regulation applies.141 
 
3 (“Brussels I Recast, the Hague Convention on Choice of Forum Agreements, the 
Lugano 2007 Convention and also domestic rules govern choice-of-court agreements 
in civil and commercial matters. [An E.U.] Judge that is served with a claim 
regarding a forum clause is bound by all these instruments. Therefore, the first issue 
is to decide which instrument applies.”). 
 137. Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
Dec. 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Recast), art. 4, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7; Schaller, supra note 50, at 128. 
 138. The Brussels Regulation (recast) significantly expands the scope of the 
Regulation. See Sarah Garvey, Brussels Regulation (Recast): Are You Ready?, ALLEN & 
OVERY: PUBLICATIONS (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-
gb/Pages/BRUSSELS-REGULATION-(RECAST)-ARE-YOU-READY.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/FSN7-FEVB] (“Perhaps the most significant change here is that the domicile 
requirement for parties to an Article 25 jurisdiction agreement has been dropped, so a 
jurisdiction clause will fall within the scope of Article 25 even if none of the parties are 
domiciled in a member state. This change has significantly expanded the scope of those 
jurisdiction agreements captured by the Brussels regime.”). 
 139. Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 provides, in relevant part: 
If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the 
courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which 
have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal 
relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the 
agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that 
Member State. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have 
agreed otherwise. 
Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, art. 25, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 11. 
 140. Id. 
 141. There is a more compelling case for application of the Brussels Regulation 
when the parties choose a Member State as the exclusive forum for dispute 
resolution, along with the law of that Member State. And, in fact, it is customary for a 
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Even if the Brussels Regulation could be said to apply when the 
parties choose the law of a Member State,142 there is the added wrinkle 
of what is covered by Brussels Regulation law and what is covered by 
national law. Issues related to whether a clause is mandatory or 
permissive are said to be governed by Brussels Regulation law.143 
Accordingly, a U.S. court would have resort to European law on this 
particular question.144 Thus, a U.S. court would look at jurisprudence 
from the European Court of Justice and domestic courts of Member 
States interpreting the Brussels Regulation.145 Issues of scope, on the 
other hand, are left to national law. Professor Merrett emphasizes that 
“it is clear that national law still has an important role to play in the 
operation of Article 23 [now Article 25 of the Brussels Regulation] 
because questions as to interpretation, and therefore the scope of the 
jurisdiction agreement, remain a question of national law, namely the 
applicable law.”146 So, even if a U.S. court were to apply Brussels 
Regulation law to certain interpretation questions, such as whether a 
clause is mandatory or permissive, the court would still have to apply the 
internal law of the Member State to other interpretation questions.147 
 
forum selection clause and choice of law clause to match up. However, courts have not 
clearly articulated this as the basis for concluding that the Brussels Regulation applies. 
 142. Some parties and courts fail to recognize the potential applicability of the 
Brussels Regulation. See, e.g., Trade Wind Distribution, LLC v. Unilux AG, No. 10 
CIV. 5716 (BMC), 2011 WL 4382986, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2011) (using domestic 
German law to determine whether forum selection clause provided for exclusive 
jurisdiction in Germany). 
 143. Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn plc v. Petereit, 1992 E.C.R. I-1745. 
 144. But see Perella Weinberg Partners UK LLP v. Codere SA [2016] EWHC (Comm) 
1182 [9], [23] (Eng.) (Brussels Regulation case but English court applied English 
principles of construction to determine whether clause was exclusive or non-exclusive). 
 145. See Li v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 183 F. Supp. 3d 348, 357–58 
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (defendant references a European Court of Justice case where the 
court was interpreting the Brussels Regulation); IDV N. Am., Inc. v. Saronno, No. CV 
99058059, 1999 WL 773961, at *13, *18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1999) (parties 
referencing Italian jurisprudence to interpret the Brussels Regulation and the court 
rejecting Italian courts’ interpretation of the Brussels Regulation); Germaninvestments 
AG v. Allomet Corp., No. 2018-0666-JRS, 2019 WL 2236844, at *7–9 (Del. Ch. May 31, 
2019) (Delaware court utilizing Austrian jurisprudence to interpret the Brussels 
Regulation). 
 146. Louise Merrett, Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: A Comprehensive Code for 
Jurisdiction Agreements?, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 546–47 (2009). 
 147. Powell Duffryn, 1992 E.C.R. I-1745; see also Skype Techs. SA v. Joltid Ltd [2009] 
EWHC (Ch) 2783, [2011] I.L.Pr. [103], [110] (Eng.) (“Whether a claim falls within 
an agreed jurisdiction clause is a question of interpretation of the clause in question. 
That question is to be decided according to national law, even in the context of the 
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This would mean that a U.S. court would apply forum law to the validity 
and enforceability of a forum selection clause, Brussels Regulation 
(European) law to whether the clause is mandatory or permissive, and 
domestic Member State law to other interpretation questions. 
As if that were not enough, there are also renvoi-type issues to 
consider.148 The doctrine of renvoi recognizes that when parties 
chose the “law” of some state, that law necessarily encompasses a 
state’s choice of law rules. Those choice of law rules might in turn, 
point toward applying some other body of law.149 In other words, 
when the parties choose a state’s law, they may intend for a court to 
apply that state’s whole law, including its conflict of laws rules.150 In 
 
Judgments Regulation.” (citing Case C-269/95, Benincasa v. Dentalkit Srl [1997] 
E.T.M.R. 447; Knorr-Bremse Sys. for Commercial Vehicles Ltd. v. Haldex Brake 
Prods. GmbH [2008] EWHC (Pat) 156, [2008] F.S.R. 30)). 
 148. Arguably, choosing whether to use domestic law or treaty law is, itself, a 
renvoi issue. U.S. courts tend not to engage in a renvoi analysis, perhaps because the 
Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws’ position is that a choice of law clause should 
ordinarily be interpreted to refer to a foreign forum’s internal law. With that said, 
the renvoi issue has occasionally creeped up in the case law. For instance, in Cerami-
Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 733 P.2d 1143 (Idaho 1989), the parties had provided 
that their contract would be “interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the 
state of Florida.” Id. at 1145. The court concluded that “the district court technically 
should have applied Florida law expressly to determine the validity of the forum 
selection clause in the contract . . . . The question then becomes how the Florida 
courts regard the enforceability of forum selection clauses.” Id. at 1145–46. The court 
then determined that Florida courts would not enforce a forum selection clause that 
violated a strong public policy of the forum from which the suit had been excluded, 
in this case, Idaho. Id. at 1146. Accordingly, the Idaho court essentially looked to do 
what the Florida court would do—and the Florida court would look to whether the 
action would violate the public policy of Idaho. Id. at 1147. Although the renvoi issue 
arose in the unusual context of the enforceability of a forum selection clause, it 
shows that the analysis into the law that governs the forum selection clause is much 
more complicated than appears at first blush. 
 149. Renvoi is “[t]he problem arising when one state’s rule on conflict of laws 
refers a case to the law of another state, and that second state’s conflict-of-law rule 
refers the case either back to the law of the first state or to a third state.” Renvoi, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 150. U.S. courts are generally not fans of renvoi. See Courson, supra note 90, at 626 
(“Not surprisingly, various conflict of laws schemes set limits on the applicability of 
conflict of laws rules of a State other than those of the seized court. For example, the 
[Restatement] . . . addresses circumstances where a forum’s conflict of laws rules 
requires the application of ‘the law’ of another state. Here, subject to two exceptions, 
the Restatement counsels courts to apply the ‘local law’ of the other state. ‘Local law’ 
as used in the Restatement refers to the law of a state exclusive of that state’s choice 
of law rules.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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short, the goal of renvoi is for the forum to replicate what the chosen 
law would do in the circumstances.151 Because renvoi is conceptually 
amorphous, it is helpful to view the issue in more concrete terms. 
Assume that the parties have chosen “English law” to govern all 
contractual disputes. A U.S. court could apply internal English law to the 
interpretation questions presented by the forum selection clause.152 That 
is, a U.S. court would look to how English courts interpret the 
ambiguous words and phrases contained in the forum selection clause 
at issue. This would involve no renvoi and is clearly the simplest 
solution. However, there is another possibility—in applying English 
law to interpret the forum selection clause, a U.S. court could apply 
England’s whole law, including its choice of law rules. This involves 
the question of renvoi. In this scenario the U.S. court would ask, 
“What would England do if presented with the interpretation of a 
forum selection clause?” and seek to mirror that result.153 In the 
above example, it could be that England regards the interpretation 
question as procedural and therefore governed by forum law. If 
English law applies forum law to the question of interpretation, then 
arguably, there is a case for “remission”—metaphorically sending the 
case “back” to be governed by U.S. law.154 
 
 151. Id. at 624–25 (“The fact that a forum may have different sets of law applicable 
to [a forum selection agreement] analysis raises perhaps the most complex issue . . . . 
Which of the chosen forum’s laws should apply and which, if any, should be 
excluded? Should courts look only to the domestic law of the chosen forum or 
should they also consider the private international law of the chosen forum? The 
latter question puts courts in the unenviable position of considering the ‘Sphinx-like’ 
question of renvoi.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 152. For the purpose of this hypothetical, I am ignoring the potential applicability 
of the Brussels Regulation. The English government has published a draft statutory 
instrument addressing the question of how the UK courts will treat questions of 
jurisdiction and judgment enforcement involving E.U. Member States post-Brexit. See 
generally The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 
2019, SI 2019/479 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/479/made 
?view=plain [https://perma.cc/ECF6-B2KQ]. 
 153. Professor Clermont argues that U.S. courts should apply a foreign forum’s 
whole law, including its conflicts rules. He asserts that “[w]henever one looks to 
foreign law on interpreting a forum-selection clause, one is looking for how the 
foreign court would read it. One must unearth which law the foreign court would 
actually apply to the forum-selection clause. Then all courts can reach the same 
result.” Clermont, supra note 23, at 662. 
 154. This is not a typical renvoi problem. Renvoi problems usually result when the 
chosen law would apply some other body of law because its choice of law rules point 
in that direction. This is different than the scenario presented above because the 
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There is another renvoi-type issue that is worth considering. What 
happens if the chosen law would deem the forum selection clause to 
be invalid?155 For instance, assume that English law invalidates all 
forum selection clauses in consumer contracts. The parties enter into 
a consumer contract containing an English forum selection clause 
and an English choice of law clause. One party sues in the United 
States in contravention of the clause. A U.S. court applying English 
law to questions of interpretation would be engaging in a completely 
irrational analysis. If English law would invalidate the forum selection 
clause in the consumer contract, it would never have occasion to 
interpret it. By bifurcating the analysis, such that validity is governed 
by forum law and interpretation is governed by the chosen law, a U.S. 
court may be interpreting something that an English court would 
never interpret. Thus, the exercise is entirely artificial. 
This Section illustrates that even identifying “what law” to apply is a 
highly complex endeavor. Courts and parties struggle when determining 
whether to apply domestic law or treaty law to the interpretation of a 
forum selection clause. And even if domestic law does apply, there are 
further renvoi-type complications. All of this militates against applying 
 
scenario above would essentially re-characterize the issue according to the chosen law. 
That is, because England might view interpretation as a procedural matter or a 
matter of validity, it would apply forum law (and not the chosen law) to the matter. 
Professor Roosevelt notes that “[t]he easiest way to create a renvoi is through a 
difference in two states’ choice-of-law rules.” Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: 
The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 
1828–30 (2005). However, renvoi problems can also arise where courts “characterize 
a cause of action differently.” Id. at 1829. He notes: 
If one state’s courts see the case as presenting a tort issue, and the other 
state’s courts as a contract action, they may again each conclude that the 
other state’s law applies. Likewise, disagreement over the classification of an 
issue as substantive or procedural can have the same effects, since courts will 
follow local procedure even when applying foreign substantive law. 
Id. at 1829–30 (footnotes omitted). 
 155. This is not technically a renvoi issue. However, a similar issue was raised by 
Professor Davies in relation to the leading Australian case on renvoi. See Martin 
Davies, Note, Nelson v. Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd: Renvoi and 
Presumptions about Foreign Law, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 244, 256 (2006) (“If, for whatever 
reason, the foreign court would not have or retain jurisdiction according to its own 
rules . . . what should the Australian court do? The answer seems simple, if perhaps rather 
shocking to conflict of laws scholars: the court should apply Australian law, the lex fori. 
What other alternative is there? To apply Chinese law to a case that would not even be 
heard by a Chinese court seems even more perverse than to apply Chinese law to a case 
that a Chinese court would consider to be governed by non-Chinese law.”). 
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the parties’ chosen law to interpretation questions and instead 
viewing the interpretation exercise as intertwined with the 
determination of a clause’s validity and enforceability, calling for an 
application of forum law. 
B.   What Happens When No Law is Chosen? 
Using the parties’ chosen law to interpret forum selection clauses 
leads to an analytical disconnect between contracts with choice of law 
clauses and contracts without choice of law clauses. There seems to 
be agreement among scholars that if interpretation issues are to be 
governed by the parties’ chosen law, then the same approach should 
follow when the parties have not chosen a governing law.156 In other 
words, if we are to accept that the law governing the contract applies 
to interpretation questions presented by a forum selection clause, 
then the principle applies equally whether or not the parties have 
chosen the governing law. Accordingly, in the absence of a choice of 
law clause, courts should first ascertain what the governing law of the 
contract would be—through a formal conflicts analysis—and then 
apply that law to issues of forum selection clause interpretation. 
For instance, assume that the parties have agreed “to adjudicate all 
disputes in the courts of Italy.” They have not, however, designated a 
governing law. As is typical, one of the parties files suit in a forum 
other than Italy (say, Delaware). A Delaware court should determine 
what law governs the underlying contract by reference to its domestic 
choice of law rules.157 This analysis would lead a Delaware court to 
some body of law—perhaps Italian law, perhaps Delaware law, 
perhaps some other body of law. Whatever body of law governs the 
contract would be used to interpret the forum selection clause. This 
is the most theoretically sound result, such that all forum selection 
clauses would be governed by the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract at issue, whether or not they contain a choice of law clause. 
As recognized by the Fifth Circuit, “the presence or absence of a 
specific choice-of-law clause does not alter the core obligation of a 
federal court, sitting in diversity, to ascertain which body of 
substantive law to apply by implementing the choice-of-law rules of its 
 
 156. Clermont, supra note 23, at 661 (“The law of the chosen court should 
normally govern interpretation of the forum-selection clause even in the absence of a 
choice-of-law clause.”). 
 157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 188 (Am. Law Inst. 1971). 
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home jurisdiction.”158 The problem is that most courts simply do not 
engage in this sort of analysis159—and it is unlikely that they will 
anytime soon.160 Why? 
It may be that courts and parties do not even have it on their 
horizon that some law other than forum law could govern the 
interpretation of a forum selection clause. Since issues of validity, 
enforceability, and interpretation tend to mesh together, litigants 
and judges may uncritically assume that forum law is the appropriate 
reference point. This is particularly so in cases without an explicit 
choice of law clause to remind courts and parties that a choice of law 
inquiry needs to be undertaken. Alternatively, even if parties are 
aware of the issue, they may choose not to raise choice of law for one 
reason or another. A party may decide that it is not worth the time or 
expense of injecting choice of law issues into the calculus. Or, a party 
may realize that it would fare worse if a U.S. court used the law 
dictated by a choice of law analysis in the interpretation exercise. The 
bottom line is that courts and litigants treat contracts containing 
explicit choice of law clauses differently than contracts not 
containing choice of law clauses when it comes to interpreting a 
forum selection clause.161 This leads to a conceptual disconnect 
between cases involving choice of law clauses and those not involving 
choice of law clauses. 
 
 158. Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 159. Buxbaum, supra note 22, at 149 (“In interpreting forum selection clauses 
when the contract in question does not include a choice of law, courts are even more 
likely simply to apply forum law to questions of interpretation. Relatively few will go 
through the process of applying the forum’s choice of law rules in an effort to 
identify the law governing the contract. Some courts justify this approach by 
concluding that the choice of court was implicitly also a choice of the forum’s law. 
Other courts may simply be avoiding complicated conflicts analysis.”). 
 160. But see Weber, 811 F.3d at 769 (“First, we review the record to determine the 
best possible English-language rendering of the German-language [forum selection 
clause]. Second, we apply Texas choice-of-law rules to determine which substantive law governs the 
interpretation of the [forum selection clause]. Third, we apply that substantive law to the 
language of the [forum selection clause] to decide whether it is mandatory or permissive. 
We conclude that this [forum selection clause] is mandatory.” (emphasis added)). 
 161. One other reason why courts might avoid the choice of law exercise in the 
absence of a clause is that the process for ascertaining the governing law is “laborious 
[and] indeterminate.” Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1135. 
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C.   The Principle of Party Prosecution 
Things become even more convoluted when one considers that 
issues of pleading and proof of foreign law are generally subject to 
party prosecution. If the parties do not raise the possibility of the 
chosen law applying to interpret a forum selection clause, a court will 
usually decide any interpretation issues in accordance with forum 
law.162 In the words of one court: 
Courts may be justified in pretermitting this analysis when neither 
party contends that any distinctive feature of the relevant 
substantive law decides the dispute. And indeed, parties’ failure to 
brief choice-of-law analysis or arguments about distinctive features 
of foreign law seems to have driven many courts to default to 
general contract principles, even when they recognize that either 
ordinary choice-of-law rules or a valid choice-of-law clause would, in 
principle, dictate application of foreign law.163 
Parties often fail to raise or brief the issue that the parties’ chosen 
law may govern the interpretation of the forum selection clause, so it 
is common to see courts resorting to forum law despite the presence 
of a choice of law clause.164 In many cases, parties raise the possibility 
 
 162. Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 99 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(treating failure to raise the issue of foreign law as waiver). 
 163. Weber, 811 F.3d at 771. 
 164. See, e.g., Glob. Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221, 224–25 
n.3 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We note that we are not applying Irish law to our analysis of the 
forum selection clause, despite the Heads of Agreement’s choice of law provision 
designating the agreement is to be ‘governed by Irish Law.’ Although choice of law 
provisions are generally applied when determining whether a forum selection clause 
is mandatory or permissive under step two of the Phillips analysis, because neither 
party has presented any evidence regarding how Irish law would interpret the 
provision at issue in this case, and because neither party has objected on appeal to 
the district court’s reliance on federal law to resolve this issue below, we will ‘apply 
general contract law principles and federal precedent to discern the meaning and 
scope of the forum clause.’” (citing Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 385–
86 (2d Cir. 2007))); Rosehoff Ltd. v. Cataclean Ams. LLC, No. 12-CV-1143A, 2013 
WL 2389725, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. May 30, 2013) (“Section 19 of the Licensing Agreement 
contains language that British law will govern ‘every particular’ of the agreement, 
‘including formation and interpretation.’ This language, on its face, would appear to 
mean that the Court has to use procedural British law even to assess whether the 
parties’ dispute should go to a British court for determination under substantive 
British law . . . . Nonetheless, the parties have not cited any provision of British law at 
any time in the history of this case. In its request for supplemental briefing, the Court 
indirectly gave the parties one more opportunity to cite British law when addressing 
whether a British court could have jurisdiction to enforce violations of federal trademark 
and patent law by agreement of the parties. The supplemental briefing again contains 
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of the chosen law governing the interpretation of the forum selection 
clause, then proceed to cite exclusively to federal law on the issue.165 
Sometimes parties choose to rely on foreign law for some interpretation 
issues, and forum law for others.166 In some cases, it seems like the 
parties are not really clear on what law they even want to apply.167 
Given the principle of party prosecution, there is a patchwork 
approach to the question of what law a court will apply to interpret a 
forum selection clause. Variables that will go into the mix include 
whether the parties have explicitly chosen a governing law, whether 
the parties have raised the choice of law issue, and whether the court 
independently decides to apply chosen law to interpretation issues. 









only citations to U.S. federal law. Since the parties appear not to object to using federal 
law for the limited purpose of assessing the enforceability of the forum selection clause, 
the Court’s substantive analysis below will proceed in that way.”). 
 165. AdvanceMe, Inc. v. Le Magnifique, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-02175-RWS, 2014 WL 
61526, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 2014) (arguing that the court “must interpret the 
forum selection clause under New York law pursuant to the New York choice of law 
provision” but then “cit[ing] only federal cases from the Second Circuit that apply 
federal law”); Hunnicutt v. CHF Sols., Inc., No. 10-CV-0042-CVE-FHM, 2010 WL 
1078470, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2010) (arguing that Minnesota law applies 
because the agreement contains a Minnesota choice of law provision, and then citing 
exclusively to federal law, not Minnesota law). 
 166. See Ujvari v. 1stdibs.com, Inc., No. 16 CIV. 2216 (PGG), 2017 WL 4082309, at 
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2017). 
 167. For instance, in Robatech Midwest, Inc. v. Leuthner, the court observed: 
Interestingly, the defendants seem to primarily cite Georgia substantive law for 
contract interpretation, despite the fact that it hurts their forum-selection 
argument to read the parties’ forum selection clause as prescribing Georgia law 
as the controlling law. The plaintiff, meanwhile, cites everything from Illinois to 
New Jersey to Wisconsin substantive law (among others, as interpreted by both 
state and federal courts), but never Georgia substantive law, in spite of the fact 
that it would help the plaintiff’s argument that the clause in question is not a 
forum-selection clause but actually a choice-of-law clause. 
Robatech Midwest, Inc. v. Leuthner, No. 14-CV-1230-JPS, 2015 WL 1219642, at *4 n.5 
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 17, 2015) (citation omitted). 
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Variable Possible Results 
 
No choice of law clause Court conducts choice of law inquiry 
and applies governing law or court 
applies forum law. 
 
Choice of Law Clause 
(raised by parties) 
Court will usually apply the chosen 
law; some courts apply forum law. 
 
Choice of Law Clause 
(not raised by parties) 
Court will usually apply forum law; 
some courts will apply chosen law. 
 
Thus, even if one accepted the premise that the parties’ chosen law 
(or the law directed by a choice of law analysis) should apply to 
interpretation questions, actually having a court apply that law is far 
from certain. Because of the principle of party prosecution, the 
ability of a court to control the litigation before it, and obscurity of 
the choice of law issue in the absence of an explicit clause, any 
certainty and uniformity arguments in support of having the chosen 
law govern interpretation are significantly undermined. 
D.   The Complications of Foreign Law 
There are numerous challenges presented by introducing foreign 
law into a U.S. case.168 The issue is no different when endeavoring to 
ascertain and apply foreign law to interpret a forum selection clause. 
First, there are translation difficulties. If the foreign law is in a foreign 
language, it will need to be translated into English for U.S. courts to 
work with. This translation exercise is fraught with difficulties since 
translated words often do not carry the same connotation in English 
 
 168. See Peter Hay, The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in Civil Litigation in the 
United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 213, 213–15 (2014) for a general overview of the use 
of foreign law in U.S. courts. See also Roger M. Michalski, Pleading and Proving Foreign 
Law in the Age of Plausibility Pleading, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1207, 1245–48 (2011) 
(explaining the practical problems U.S. courts encounter when simply determining 
what foreign law to apply and how to apply it); Matthew J. Wilson, Improving the 
Process: Transnational Litigation and the Application of Private Foreign Law in U.S. Courts, 
45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1111, 1121 (2013) (laying out the problems U.S. judges 
face in applying foreign law, which include: a general unfamiliarity with foreign laws 
and their concepts; a lack of training in applying foreign law; administrative 
demands that drain time and energy; and a general “lack of resources and disparities 
in language, legal practice, and the different role of judges in foreign countries”). 
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as in the original language.169 Additionally, parties may not even 
agree on what the appropriate translation of foreign law is.170 
Second, law does not exist in a vacuum and cannot be plucked 
wholesale from the system from which it originates. A U.S. court 
cannot simply excise certain words and phrases from a foreign statute 
or a case without appreciating the backdrop against which the 
foreign law operates.171 Accordingly, U.S. courts must examine 
foreign law in context—a context they may not be familiar with. 
Third, U.S. courts face problems related to proof of foreign law. 
Typically, courts rely on parties to present them with the content of 
foreign law. This is usually effectuated by parties presenting expert 
affidavits from lawyers or academics who are specialists in foreign law. 
The complexity of the battle of the experts cannot be overstated. In 
TH Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd.,172 for 
instance, the parties submitted affidavits from six different experts on 
Dutch law. Several of these declarations were in excess of twenty 
pages.173 The experts’ opinions conflicted as to whether the forum 
selection clause at issue was exclusive or non-exclusive under Dutch 
law. The court seemed to throw up its hands, emphasizing that the 
court “is not nor does it purport to be an expert in the law of The 
Netherlands.”174 The court then rested on the plaintiff’s inability to 
rebut the presumption that a forum selection clause is ordinarily 
considered exclusive under the Brussels Regulation.175 The court 
made no effort to grapple with the (presumably) hundreds of pages 
 
 169. See Thomas O. Main, The Word Commons and Foreign Laws, 46 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 219, 230–31 (2013) (“Language is famously indeterminate. Even within a single 
discourse community, one word can have multiple meanings. Multiple words can share 
one meaning. The meaning of words can change over time. New ideas and concepts 
spawn new words. And ambiguity, vagueness, and generality are de rigueur. Accordingly, 
the study of meaning can be the study of something ephemeral, elusive, and enigmatic.”). 
 170. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
parties submitted competing translations of the relevant Swiss law). 
 171. Hay, supra note 168, at 221–22 (“American judges view foreign law through 
an American lens . . . . For example, the premise that judicial opinions serve the 
same function in the French legal system as they do in the American legal system is 
false.” (quoting Philip D. Stacey, Rule 44.1, Bodum USA v. La Cafetiere, and the 
Challenge of Determining Foreign Law, 6 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 472, 494–95 (2011))). 
 172. 416 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1079 (D. Kan. 2006), aff’d, 488 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 
2007). 
 173. See id. at 1078. 
 174. Id. at 1079. 
 175. Id. 
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of expert testimony before it. Similarly, in Sberbank of Russia v. 
Traisman,176 the court was presented with conflicting expert affidavits 
on Russian law. Again, rather than engage with Russian law, the court 
simply seemed to side with one of the experts because of “his 
credentials as a scholar of Russian law and his citation to Russian 
legal authority that supports his opinion.”177 
In addition to wading through the morass of expert affidavits, the 
court must consider that these “experts” are in fact hired guns.178 As 
aptly stated by Judge Posner in arguably the leading case on the use 
of foreign law in U.S. courts, Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc.: 
Lawyers who testify to the meaning of foreign law, whether they are 
practitioners or professors, are paid for their testimony and 
selected on the basis of the convergence of their views with the 
litigating position of the client, or their willingness to fall in with 
the views urged upon them by the client. These are the banes of 
expert testimony.179 
In the same case, Judge Easterbrook emphasized that proving 
foreign law through experts “adds an adversary’s spin, which the 
court must then discount.”180 
Finally, interjecting foreign law into a case dramatically increases 
the cost and complexity for the parties and the court. Parties need to 
hire foreign law experts, who certainly do not come cheap. One 
commentator explains: 
Finding a capable, credible expert remains a huge challenge for 
litigants. As one scholar from the print era noted: “they are not 
listed in the yellow pages.” And in the Internet age, despite a 
plethora of claims of expertise online, few people have what it takes 
to empower a judge to comfortably construe foreign law. The best 
experts will perform a “‘double process of translation’” wherein 
they analyze terms and concepts embedded within the culture of 
the foreign legal system and then explain those terms and concepts 
 
 176. No. 3:14cv216 (WWE), 2014 WL 10999674, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 14, 2014). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. 
Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 
891 (2011) (discussing various issues that arise when courts rely on the adversarial 
process to produce expert testimony on foreign law, such as litigants who attempt to 
“‘muddy the waters’ by painting an overly complicated picture of foreign law, even if 
the law is simple and fairly straightforward”). 
 179. Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Posner, J., concurring). 
 180. Id. at 629 (majority opinion). 
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within the context of the U.S. legal framework. Needless to say, this 
process requires fluency in both the foreign legal system and the 
U.S. legal system plus impeccable language and communication 
skills. Many litigants will not be able to afford the substantial costs 
involved with identifying and hiring a foreign law expert.181 
Not only is this a costly and complicated endeavor for litigants, but 
it is also burdensome for courts. When faced with issues of foreign 
law, courts need to devote more time and institutional resources to 
sorting out these issues than they would simply applying forum law to 
interpretation issues.182 And, it bears repeating that all these foreign 
law complications arise before a case even begins. 
E.   Interpretation in Practice: Courts Do Not Do a Good Job Applying the 
Chosen Law 
That courts should not apply the parties’ chosen law to interpret a 
forum selection clause is plainly evident in the cases themselves. 
Below, I make five observations about how courts are faring in using 
the parties’ chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. As noted 
above, the cases here focus exclusively on courts’ using foreign law 
when it is chosen by the parties. 
1. Problem One: Courts are “all over the place” in their analysis 
Many courts do not seem to be on solid footing when it comes to 
applying the parties’ chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. 
Accordingly, the analysis is all over the place, mixing forum and 
foreign law as though it were interchangeable. A prime example of 
this free-flowing approach to interpretation is EnQuip Technologies 
Group v. Tycon Technoglass S.R.I.183 In EnQuip, the American plaintiff 
sued the Italian defendant in Ohio.184 The parties’ contract contained 
a forum selection clause in favor of Italy, and a choice of law clause 
providing that all disputes would be governed by Italian law.185 The 
 
 181. Loren Turner, Buried Treasure: Excavating Foreign Law from Civil Pleadings Filed 
in U.S. Federal Courts, 47 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 22, 40–41 (2019) (footnote omitted). 
 182. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign 
country’s law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining foreign 
law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether 
or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The 
court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”). 
 183. 986 N.E.2d 469, 474 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012). 
 184. Id. at 472–73. 
 185. Id. at 473. 
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court determined that Italian law should govern the interpretation of 
the forum selection clause, and in particular, the question of whether 
the provision “the law Court of Venice will be competent for any 
dispute” was a mandatory or permissive forum selection clause.186 
The court inexplicably started off its analysis by applying Ohio 
(forum) interpretative principles to the dispute. The court cited to 
Ohio law for the proposition that language in a contract bears the 
meaning intended by the parties to the contract.187 The court also 
referred generally to Ohio principles of contractual interpretation, 
such as the rule that a contract must be read as a whole and that 
meaning must be determined contextually.188 Following this, the 
court explored Ohio principles governing the distinction between 
mandatory and permissive jurisdiction clauses.189 After this extensive 
recitation of Ohio law and much more meandering through Ohio 
and federal case law, the court finally turned to Italian law, which it 
had said at the outset would apply to the question of interpretation.190 
The Ohio court determined that because Italy was a signatory to 
the Brussels Regulation, that legal instrument governed whether the 
impugned clause was mandatory or permissive.191 Beyond that, the court 
engaged in very little meaningful analysis. It quoted the relevant provision 
of the Brussels Regulation—that if parties agree that a particular court is 
“to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may 
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court . . . shall 
have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties 
have agreed otherwise.”192 The court made no effort to determine 
whether the parties had “agreed otherwise.” It cited only three Italian 
cases in its entire judgment. The extent of its analysis of Italian law 
was largely as follows: 
Italy’s highest court . . . has held that a forum-selection clause in 
which the parties agree that ‘‘the competent court for any possible 
dispute is the court of the initiating party” conferred exclusive 
jurisdiction on that court. The Court of Genoa has said that it is 
 
 186. Id. at 474, 480. 
 187. Id. at 475. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 476. 
 190. Id. at 476–80. 
 191. Id. at 480. 
 192. Id. at 481. 
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not necessary for the clause to expressly refer to the identified 
court’s exclusivity.193 
The Ohio court provided no elaboration beyond the one quote. 
The court then abruptly turned to English law, reasoning that 
England is also a signatory to the Brussels Regulation.194 However, the 
Ohio court did not actually look to English law on the matter, but 
rather a U.S. federal court’s interpretation of what English law was.195 
In short, the mix of Ohio, federal, Italian, and English law was a 
mess. It was impossible to glean what the court was doing at any given 
moment. This mish-mash is fairly typical of how courts approach the 
interpretation exercise when it involves applying the parties’ chosen 
law, particularly when that law is foreign law.196 
2. Problem Two: Courts rely on other U.S. courts’ interpretation of foreign 
law 
A major problem with many of the cases that apply the parties’ chosen 
law to issues of interpretation is that they rely on a U.S. court’s 
interpretation of the chosen law, not the chosen law itself. That is, instead 
of canvassing and analyzing legal authority from the actual chosen law, 
many courts simply rely on what other U.S. courts say this law is.197 
Amto, LLC v. Bedford Asset Management, LLC198 is emblematic of the 
approach that courts seem to be taking. In Amto, the Southern District of 
New York decided to apply the parties’ chosen law, English law, to 
decide the forum selection clause’s scope.199 Instead of actually looking 
at English law, the court looked at “[t]wo recent cases from the Second 
Circuit [that] provide a helpful exploration of English law on the subject 
 
 193. Id. at 480 (citation omitted). The court looked to Italian law for a throwaway 
proposition, as well. Id. at 481 (“Italy’s highest court has said that because Article 23 
is ‘substantially analogous’ to Article 17 the interpretation of Article 23 must be 
based on Article 17. Saneco S.A. v. Toscoline S.r.l. (2006).”). 
 194. Id. at 481. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Schaller, supra note 50, at 181 n.334 (“[T]he court states [that] the chosen 
foreign law should be applied to interpretation issues but then cites and discusses only U.S. 
cases in discussing interpretation issues and thus does not really ‘apply’ the foreign law.”). 
 197. Turner, supra note 181, at 46 (noting that U.S. courts’ interpretations of 
foreign law may provide a “jumping off point” but that “it doesn’t guarantee accuracy 
of the content of foreign law”). 
 198. 168 F. Supp. 3d 556, 565–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 199. Id. at 564. 
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of the scope of forum selection clauses.”200 After a detailed recitation of 
what these two New York cases said English law was, the court concluded 
that the defendant’s “defenses, counterclaims, and third-party claims are 
much more akin to the claims in [U.S. Case 1] than the claims 
in [U.S. Case 2].”201 Similarly, in Laspata DeCaro Studio Corp. v. Rimowa 
GmbH,202 the court purportedly interpreted the forum selection clause’s 
language in accordance with German law without citing one German 
case. Instead, it noted that “[American] courts applying German law 
have held similar language to be mandatory.”203 It then cited to three 
U.S. cases that interpreted similar language applying German law.204 
The approach that U.S. courts use to foreign law in this context is 
reminiscent of the children’s game commonly known as “Broken 
Telephone.”205 The game involves one child whispering something to the 
next child and that child whispering it to the next. By the end of the 
“telephone line,” what was originally said has completely morphed into 
something else. The same is true here. One court pronounces what “X 
law” is, and other courts keep repeating it until the law becomes 
something it is not. 
3. Problem Three: Courts generally do not engage in meaningful analysis of 
foreign law 
In most cases involving U.S. courts applying the parties’ chosen law to 
questions of forum selection clause interpretation, U.S. courts do not 
engage in a meaningful analysis. Instead, they simply pick one side with 
little justification, rest on the burden of proof, or make some cursory or 
generic statements about the chosen law and then draw a conclusion. 
For instance, in IDV North America, Inc. v. Saronno,206 the court 
applied the parties’ chosen law, Italian law, to determine the scope of 
the forum selection clause. The court noted that it had received 
conflicting affidavits from experts in Italian law. The experts 
apparently also disagreed on whether domestic Italian law or the 
 
 200. Id. at 565; see also Longo v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 63, 69 
(E.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 201. Amto, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 567. 
 202. No. 16 Civ. 934 (LGS), 2017 WL 1906863 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017). 
 203. Id. at *5. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Cf. Chinese Whispers, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2014) 
(synonymous English term) (“Any situation where information is passed on in turn 
by a number of people, often becoming distorted in the process.”). 
 206. No. CV 99058059, 1999 WL 773961, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1999). 
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Brussels Regulation was the appropriate reference point.207 The court 
then seemed to break the impasse by invoking the burden of proof, 
stating that “the defendant has failed to show that under Italian law, the 
language of the forum selection clause confers exclusive jurisdiction on 
the Italian court.”208 The court cited two Italian cases in parentheticals and 
briefly referenced the Brussels Regulation (without deciding on whether 
the Brussels Regulation governed the issue).209 The court did not grapple 
with the authorities or actually delve into the relevant language. Instead, it 
just seemed to pick one side with little reasoning or justification.210 
In LVAR L.P. v. Bermuda Commercial Bank Ltd.,211 the court also half-
heartedly applied foreign law to interpret the forum selection clause 
at issue.212 In that case, the court said it was applying Bermudan law to 
the question of whether the forum selection clause was mandatory or 
permissive.213 It cited one Bermudan case in its entire analysis, Re A Trust; 
the rest of the citations were to American authorities.214 On the separate 
interpretative issue of whether all the parties involved were covered by the 
forum selection clause, the court did not even bother citing to Bermudan 
law. Instead, it cited exclusively to federal law on point.215 
 
 207. See id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. For another case where the court rested on the burden of proof, see EIG 
Energy Fund XIV, L.P. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A., 246 F. Supp. 3d 52, 77–78 (D.D.C. 
2017) (“The only evidence of how forum selection clauses operate under Brazilian 
law comes from Plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Tucci . . . . The court has no choice but 
to accept [the conclusion provided by the Plaintiffs’ expert]. Petrobras bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the forum selection clause applies to the parties’ 
dispute . . . .”), aff’d, 894 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1324 
(2019). The conclusion is surprising since the court readily conceded that “the D.C. 
Circuit has not yet weighed in on this choice-of-law issue” (i.e., the question of 
whether forum or chosen law should govern). Id. at 77; see also Sberbank of Russ. v. 
Traisman, No. 3:14cv216 (WWE), 2014 WL 10999674, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 14, 2014) 
(“Defendant’s expert Apalikov proffers no persuasive Russian legal authority to 
support his proposition that a non-signatory and a non-third party beneficiary to an 
agreement retains the ability to enforce the provisions of a non-adhesive commercial 
agreement favoring a specific venue.”). 
 211. No. 13 Civ. 9148 (AT), 2015 WL 1267368 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2015), aff’d, 649 
F. App’x 25 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 212. See id. at *4. 
 213. Id. at *3. 
 214. Id. at *3–4. In its analysis, there were citations to seven U.S. cases and the 
Restatement of Trusts. 
 215. Id. at *4; see also Giordano v. UBS, AG, 134 F. Supp. 3d 697, 702–03 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (citing only U.S. cases, even though the court said Swiss law applied). 
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Oftentimes, U.S. courts give the appearance of applying foreign 
law—by citing broad and non-controversial statements of foreign 
law—but then quickly dispose of the interpretation questions without 
significant discussion. For instance, in DBS Solutions LLC v. Infovista 
Corp.,216 the court referenced French treatises for generic statements 
of French law: “[u]nder French law, courts interpreting a contract 
attempt to discern the mutual intent of the parties”;217 “a clear and 
precise contract must not be ‘denatured’ by resort to one party’s 
declaration of intent”;218 and, “French courts favor forum selection clauses 
in international commercial agreements.”219 The court then simply drew 
the conclusion that the dispute at issue was “related to” the contract under 
French law.220 Similarly, in Trade Wind Distribution, LLC v. Unilux Ag,221 the 
court referenced non-controversial statements of German law on which the 
parties agreed, such as the goal of interpretation being to divine the 
“parties’ true ‘intentions.’”222 The court also cited one German case from 
1972 and then concluded that German law would regard the forum 
selection clause at issue as mandatory.223 
These cases illustrate that many courts take the easy way out.224 They like 
to say that they are applying the parties’ chosen law to interpret the forum 
selection clause, but they really are not. They are including some token 
citations to foreign law, perhaps, but they are failing to meaningfully 
examine it. 
 
 216. No. 3:15-CV-03875-M, 2016 WL 3926505 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 2016). 
 217. Id. at *3 (citing JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW (2d ed. 2008)). 
 218. Id. (quoting Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 630 (7th 
Cir. 2010)). 
 219. Id. (citing PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Horatia 
Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 2014)). 
 220. Id. The sentence where the court apparently explains this conclusion does 
not make grammatical sense. See id. (“According to a summary of French law 
provided by Defendants, which Plaintiff has not challenged, French courts have 
treated broadly language similar to that at issue, including within its terms disputes 
which have some connection to the contract.”). 
 221. No. 10 Civ. 5716 (BMC), 2011 WL 4382986 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2011). 
 222. Id. at *6. 
 223. Id. at *7. 
 224. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 178, at 890–91 (explaining that although judges 
maintain a presumption of competency, many U.S. judges refrain from examining 
cases involving foreign laws because they do not feel they have sufficient familiarity 
or expertise in foreign legal systems or civil law codes). 
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4. Problem Four: Courts tend to engage in macro level analysis 
When U.S. courts apply the parties’ chosen law to analyze the scope 
of a forum selection clause, they usually do so at a macro level, 
without examining the actual issues presented in the case at hand. For 
instance, in Martinez v. Bloomberg,225 the Second Circuit was tasked with 
determining whether the plaintiff’s statutory discrimination claim fell 
within the ambit of the forum selection clause nominating England as the 
exclusive forum for the resolution of disputes.226 The court focused on 
whether the words “arising hereunder,” contained in a forum selection 
clause, would be interpreted narrowly or broadly by an English court.227 It 
concluded that English law endorsed a broad approach to the term. The 
Martinez court then used this broad approach to conclude that English law 
would deem the plaintiff’s discrimination claim to fall within the scope of 
the forum selection clause. Accordingly, the Second Circuit enforced the 
forum selection clause by dismissing the plaintiff’s action. 
The issue in the Martinez case, however, was not whether the words 
“arising hereunder” would be interpreted broadly or narrowly under 
English law. The issue was whether a claim advanced in a U.S. court—
that the defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—
was within the ambit of the forum selection clause according to English 
law. But, of course, the Second Circuit could not cast the issue in this 
light because, thus presented, the question makes no sense. Of course 
the ADA claim is not within the purview of the clause. The ADA is a 
creature of statute, available only under U.S. law. But the Martinez court 
made no effort to ascertain how English law would interpret a forum 
selection clause where the claim advanced by the plaintiff in the non-
chosen court has no counterpart in the chosen court. If it had, then it 
might have referenced the Ryanair Ltd v. Esso Italiana Srl228 case, where 
the English court considered the interpretation of a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in which the claim involved a violation of “statutory 
duty in circumstances where there was no analogous contractual claim 
possible under the contract.”229 The court concluded that the Fiona 
Trust presumption—that the parties intended all disputes to be 
resolved in the chosen forum—was not applicable in these 
circumstances. It held that “rational businessmen would be surprised 
 
 225. 740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 226. Id. at 215–16. 
 227. Id. at 224–25. 
 228. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 1450, 2 C.L.C. 950. 
 229. Id. at [42]. 
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to be told that a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause bound or entitled 
the parties . . . to litigate in a contractually agreed forum an entirely 
non-contractual claim for breach of statutory duty . . . .”230 Accordingly, the 
English court recognized that statutory claims not having any basis in 
the contract may not fall within the ambit of a forum selection clause. 
The intention here is not to argue that Martinez was necessarily 
incorrectly decided. The intention is simply to illustrate that the 
vantage point from which the analysis takes place will necessarily 
affect the result. If a U.S. court approaches the inquiry from the 
10,000 foot level (does English law interpret “arising hereunder” 
broadly or narrowly?), this will yield a different result than if the U.S. 
court approached the inquiry at a more granular level (how does 
English law determine the scope of a forum selection clause where 
there is no legal counterpart in the chosen forum?). 
5. Problem Five: Courts unduly rely on one case—at least as it concerns 
English law 
Many cases involving the intersection between choice of law and 
forum selection clauses implicate English law and English courts.231 
Accordingly, U.S. courts have had myriad occasions to apply English 
law in interpreting the scope of a forum selection clause. Yet, the analysis 
is lacking in depth, breadth, and context. As discussed above, U.S. courts 
routinely piggyback on other U.S. courts’ views of English law, rather 
than going to the source. As such, it seems like one U.S. case sets out 
“English law” and the rest follow that case’s lead. In New York, that case 
is Martinez v. Bloomberg, which described in detail Fiona Trust, the leading 
English case on the interpretation of arbitration clauses.232 
 
 230. Id. at [46] (emphasis added). 
 231. This is not surprising since English courts are renowned worldwide for 
commercial law. See THE LAW SOC’Y OF ENG. & WALES, ENGLAND AND WALES: THE 
JURISDICTION OF CHOICE 5, https://www.eversheds-sutherland.com/documents/ 
LawSocietyEnglandAndWalesJurisdictionOfChoice.pdf [https://perma.cc/JGB7-RX4W] 
(“Our courts, particularly those in London, play host to many parties from overseas: 
at the specialised Commercial Court, a staggering 80% of cases involve a foreign 
claimant or defendant. Of course, that has a knock-on effect and the success of the 
legal services sector plays an unquantifiable role in helping London to maintain its 
position as a major centre for global commerce . . . . In ever more complex, 
sophisticated and inter-related markets, English commercial law provides 
predictability of outcome, legal certainty and fairness.”). 
 232. The Second Circuit described English law as follows: 
The House of Lords . . . indicated that interpretation of arbitration 
clauses should start from the assumption that “there is no rational basis upon 
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The Martinez court noted that the Fiona Trust case stands for the 
proposition that courts should broadly construe arbitration clauses.233 
Thus, a presumption arises that parties intended all disputes to fall 
within the ambit of an arbitration clause, including disputes related to 
the validity of the clause. The Martinez case took the Fiona Trust 
principle and applied it to a case involving the interpretation of a 
forum selection clause in an employment agreement.234 While the 
court acknowledged the differences between the Fiona Trust case and 
the dispute at issue in Martinez, it nonetheless concluded that English 
courts would treat the two cases similarly. Cases after Martinez seized on its 
premise that the Fiona Trust case is, essentially, the be-all-and-end-all when 
it comes to interpreting forum selection clauses under English law.235 
There are some problems, however, with U.S. courts’ exclusive 
reliance on the Fiona Trust case to guide them in interpreting forum 
selection clauses under English law. First, Fiona Trust involved the 
interpretation of an arbitration agreement, not a forum selection 
clause.236 It specifically involved whether an arbitrator should, in the 
first instance, decide issues related to the validity of an arbitration 
agreement.237 The English court concluded that the parties likely 
intended for all issues, including those of the validity of the arbitration 
 
which businessmen would be . . . likely to wish to have questions of the 
validity or enforceability of the contract decided by one tribunal and 
questions about its performance decided by another.” Consequently, it held 
that courts should presume that an arbitration clause encompasses all 
disputes involving the relationship into which the contracting parties entered 
“unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were intended to 
be excluded from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.” 
Although the Fiona Trust case involved an arbitration clause, the decision 
refers broadly to the interpretation of “jurisdiction clauses.” English courts 
have repeatedly applied the holding in the Fiona Trust case to cases involving 
forum selection clauses. 
Martinez, 740 F.3d at 224–25 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 225. 
 235. See Amto, LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt., LLC, 168 F. Supp. 3d 556, 565–66 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Martinez and the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 
Fiona Trust extensively); Longo v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 63, 69 
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Martinez for the principle that the Fiona Trust “is the 
controlling English decision on the subject”). 
 236. Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, [2] (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 237. Id. at [4]. 
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clause itself, to be decided by an arbitrator.238 Thus, the case involved the 
interpretation of an arbitration clause as it concerned the proper 
division of adjudicative authority (court vs. arbitrator).239 
U.S. courts have taken the Fiona Trust decision to mean something 
different: that when the parties agree to adjudicate “all disputes” in a 
particular forum, that phrase should be read broadly to include statutory, 
tort, and extra-contractual claims. This is not the proposition that Fiona 
Trust stands for.240 The Fiona Trust case simply stands for the proposition 
that issues related to the validity of the arbitration agreement should be 
adjudicated by the arbitrator designated by the parties.241 Ironically, U.S. 
courts deem issues of validity to be procedural matters determined by the 
law of the forum, a holding directly at odds with the Fiona Trust principle. 
Thus, U.S. courts are using the Fiona Trust authority selectively and in a way 
that differs considerably from the case holding itself. 
Second, the Fiona Trust case involved an international commercial 
dispute. Accordingly, the court observed that “rational businessmen” 
would not intend to have disputes bifurcated between the courts and an 
arbitrator.242 As such, it must be presumed that they intended one-stop-
shopping, i.e., for an arbitrator to decide all disputes. This rationale does 
not instinctively apply beyond the international commercial context. In 
particular, this rationale does not carry much weight in the consumer 
context, where a weaker party is beholden to terms imposed on it by the 
stronger party. 
Third, a closer look reveals that English courts have imposed limits on 
the Fiona Trust principle. For instance, in Deutsche Bank AG London Branch 
 
 238. Id. at [13], [19]. 
 239. See id. 
 240. Its language can be extrapolated to that different proposition—but it is a 
different proposition nonetheless. 
 241. The Martinez court concluded: 
Although the Fiona Trust case involved an arbitration clause, the decision 
refers broadly to the interpretation of “jurisdiction clauses.” English courts 
have repeatedly applied the holding in the Fiona Trust case to cases involving 
forum selection clauses. In UBS AG v. HSH Nordbank AG, the Court of Appeal 
found that “[t]he proper approach to the construction of clauses agreeing 
jurisdiction is to construe them widely and generously,” and that “in the 
usual case the words ‘arising out of’ or ‘in connection with’ apply to claims 
arising from pre-inception matters such as misrepresentation.” 
Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)). What 
the Martinez court is missing is that the Fiona Trust case was simply deciding that issues of 
validity are to be determined by the court designated in the forum selection clause. 
 242. [2007] UKHL 40 at [13]. 
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v. Petromena ASA,243 the court stated that “Since Fiona Trust . . . it is 
axiomatic as a matter of English law, that jurisdiction clauses and 
arbitration clauses should be widely and generously construed, but this 
does not extend to all relationships however different even if they are 
assumed by the parties to an original relationship.”244 In Airbus SAS v. 
Generali Italia SpA,245 the court quoted with approval Dicey and Morris’s 
treatise, stating that “the decision in Fiona Trust has limited application to 
the questions which arise where parties are bound by several contracts 
which contain jurisdiction agreements for different countries.”246 
Moreover, English courts have repeatedly held that normal canons of 
contractual constructions are to be applied in determining the scope of a 
jurisdiction clause, irrespective of the presumption in the Fiona Trust.247 
Thus, under English law, the scope of a forum selection clause does not 
rise or fall exclusively on one case, as the U.S. case law would suggest. 
As this Section illustrates, U.S. courts are not particularly interested in, 
or adept at, applying foreign law to interpret a forum selection clause. The 
exercise is complicated, convoluted, and unnecessary. In the long-run, 
litigants will fare better by having a court apply a body of law it is familiar 
with to resolve interpretation issues presented by forum selection clauses. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that courts should not apply the parties’ 
chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. The rationales 
provided in support of applying the parties’ chosen law are not 
 
 243. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 226. 
 244. Id. at [84] (citations omitted). 
 245. [2019] EWCA (Civ) 805. 
 246. Id. at [60]; see also Tr. Risk Grp. SpA v. AmTrust Eur Ltd. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 
437 [46] (quoting the same treatise; Dreymoor Fertilisers Overseas PTE Ltd. v. 
Eurochem Trading GmbH [2018] EWHC (Comm) 909 [37] (same quote)). 
 247. See BN Rendering Ltd. v. Everwarm Ltd. [2018] CSOH 45 [6] (Scot.); see also 
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc v. China Haisheng 
Juice Holdings Co. Ltd: Banking-ISDA Master Agreement, 25 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 
N23, N23–25 (2010) (“The conclusion reached by Teare J. was that the construction 
of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Master Agreement must depend upon its 
own terms. In construing the clause he accepted that he should be guided by the 
approach of Lord Collins in UBS AG v HSH Nordbank AG and by the approach of 
Lord Hoffman in Fiona Trust to the construction of arbitration clauses, but the key 
question was whether cl.13 could reasonably be understood to mean that MSIP and 
CH promised each other that claims arising out or in connection with the Master 
Agreement would be brought in England regardless of whether the claims were 
against the other or a non-party to the Master Agreement.”). 
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sufficiently compelling to counterbalance the complexity of such an 
exercise. Accordingly, U.S. courts should apply forum law to all 
preliminary questions involving forum selection clauses—validity, 
enforceability, and interpretation. This is the easiest and cleanest 
solution to the choice of law/choice of forum conundrum. 
Any perceived unfairness in this approach can easily be mitigated by 
the parties themselves. If parties clearly draft forum selection clauses, 
there is very little, if anything, that requires interpretation. Professor 
Coyle notes that “[i]f a contract is clearly drafted, of course, there will be 
no need for the courts to invoke any of the canons discussed above. 
Contract drafters should therefore aspire to state their intentions clearly, 
thereby making it unnecessary for the courts to construe a clause.”248 
Professor Coyle then provides a guide to how litigants can draft 
appropriate forum selection clauses that achieve a desired result.249 With 
respect to the two most common interpretation issues that arise—whether 
the clause is mandatory or permissive and whether the clause 
encompasses the dispute at issue—he offers the following guidance: 
If the goal is EXCLUSIVITY, use words like “sole,” “only,” 
“exclusive,” and “must” to convey an intent to litigate exclusively in 
the chosen forum. 
If the goal is NON-EXCLUSIVITY, omit all the words listed above 
and use the word “non-exclusive” or state that the parties “submit 
to jurisdiction” or “consent to venue” in the chosen forum. 
If the goal is to give the clause a BROAD SCOPE, state that the 
clause shall apply to all claims “relating to” the contract or the 
parties’ relationship. 
If the goal is to give the clause a NARROW SCOPE, state that the 
clause shall only apply to “contract claims” or to claims “arising out 
of the alleged breach of this agreement.”250 
Ultimately, since the parties themselves are able to effectively convey what 
they intend in a forum selection clause simply by taking some time to 
carefully draft it, the forum selection clause meets choice of law clause issue 
is rendered moot. But if parties fail to draft their forum selection clauses 
carefully, courts should not engage in “conflict-of-laws contortions”251 to 
honor the parties’ so-called intent by applying their chosen law to 
questions of forum selection clause interpretation. 
 
 248. Coyle, supra note 2, at 1851. 
 249. Id. tbl.1. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Mullenix, supra note 5, at 347. 
